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This study investigates the settlement period, including payment delays and failed 
deliveries that occur during the processing of U.S. equity transactions, and its effects on 
observed stock prices.  Payment and delivery occur three to six calendar days after the 
trade date in the standard three business day settlement cycle, referred to as T+3. 
 
First, the buyer benefits from a payment delay, during which time he can earn interest 
on the cash needed to settle the trade.  Since the seller has no analogous opportunity, I 
anticipated that the cost of the payment delay would be reflected in equity prices at a 
rate equivalent to the risk-free rate over the settlement period in ordinary circumstances 
and at a higher rate during financial market crises if sellers believe they may not be paid 
on time.  Using CRSP daily market index returns from 1995 through 2009, I measured 
the cost of this delay to be approximately three to five times the risk-free rate, proxied 
by the effective Fed funds rate.  These results suggest that buyers are forced to 
compensate sellers at rates greater than I expected during normal conditions. 
 
Second, the risk of failed delivery may also affect security prices if market participants 
expect that sellers will not deliver securities on time.  A failed delivery effectively 
becomes a forward transaction.  I predicted that buyers compensate sellers at the risk-
free rate over the extended settlement period.  This compensation would be in addition 
to the normal payment delay and directly related to the probability of failed delivery; 
thus, I added SEC Regulation SHO daily failed deliveries data, available from 2004 
through 2009, to the model with payment delays.  By constructing a proxy for the 
change in probability of failure from aggregated fails and market volume, I found that 
buyers compensate sellers over the lengthened settlement period due to failed 
deliveries at a rate of approximately 11 basis points daily for an increase in the 
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This study investigates payment delays and failed deliveries in the processing of U.S. 
equity transactions.1  In the current institutional framework, when two parties enter into 
a trade today, called day T, the transaction settles in three business days, on T+3, 
under normal circumstances.  Cash and securities change hands at settlement.  Due to 
intervening weekends and holidays, the T+3 system results in settlement occurring 
three to six calendar days after the trade.  The consequent payment delay benefits the 
buyer because he can earn interest on the cash needed to settle the trade over the 
settlement period, while the seller has no equivalent opportunity.  The risk of failed 
delivery may also affect security prices if market participants expect that sellers will not 
deliver securities on time.  In this study, I investigate whether observed stock prices 
reflect the settlement period.   
 
When a buyer and seller enter into an agreement to trade cash for equity securities, 
both are exposed to counterparty risk.  The seller is subject to the buyer‟s credit risk, or 
the risk that the buyer may not have the money to pay him on the settlement date.  The 
buyer is exposed to the risk of the seller‟s failure to deliver, meaning that the seller may 
not deliver the securities on the settlement date.  Counterparty risk can be very high if 
trades are bilateral agreements, but the contemporary security processing system 
described herein gives traders seemingly safer options.  Since 1973, the move away 
from the physical transfer of paper stock certificates toward a central depository coupled 
with electronic transfer of ownership should have alleviated the risk associated with 
failure to deliver.  Since 1976, a central processing organization has evolved.  It has 
improved the settlement process for financial market participants by guaranteeing 
settlement of all trades, by assuming counterparty risk, and by requiring trading parties 
to deposit collateral for settlement.  This advancement should have lessened risks 
associated with both buyer‟s credit and failure to deliver.  Since 1995, the modern 
security processing system has been characterized by settlement under the shortened 
T+3 system.  Overall, after-trade processing of equity transactions appears safer and 
faster than ever before.  Therefore, I analyze the question:  Is the system safer? 
 
To answer this question, I consider prior evidence, particularly a study by DeGennaro 
(1990), who examines the effect of payment delays on stock prices during a time period 
when different institutional details dictated the processing of equity trades.  The study 
uses data from 1970 to 1982, when the settlement cycle was longer due to both a T+5 
cycle and an additional business day for check clearing, resulting in payment delays of 
up to 12 calendar days.  Modeling stock returns as a function of payment delays, he 
finds that buyers compensate sellers for the payment delay at the risk-free rate, which 
he proxies with the Fed funds rate, over the entire sample.  However, in one subperiod 
(1970-1972), he finds that the premium was over four times the risk-free rate.  He 
suggests that this may be the result of the government‟s attempt to control wages and 
                                            
1
 This study deals only with common stock unless otherwise stated. 
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prices, or it could be due to the wrong interest rate proxy.  Then again, sellers may be 
demanding this premium because of potential processing errors that are costly to fix 
and that delay payment by more than six business days.  In addition, his study explores 
whether payment delays explain the day of the week effect, but when the payment 
delay is controlled for, the effect still exists. 
 
By comparison, I use data from the T+3 settlement regime in this study.  During this 
time, cash is available to the seller without delay for check clearing on the settlement 
day.  First, I identify and measure the compensation for the three business day payment 
delay, which is a by-product of the processing system that takes place for every normal 
equity transaction.  A knowledgeable seller realizes that the buyer gets to use his 
money for three business days after the trade, knows what this delay is worth, and 
builds a premium into prices to compensate himself.  Competition forces the buyer to 
pay this premium.  If the seller only demands compensation for the time value of money, 
then his return over the settlement period may be at the risk-free rate.  Or, he may 
require a risk premium.  For example, in the 2008 financial crisis, when financial 
institutions were closed or sold over the weekend, sellers may have built a greater rate 
of compensation than the risk-free rate into the price of equity securities.  This risk 
premium may indicate investors‟ lack of confidence in their probability of getting paid on 
time if a firm disappears or is inundated with transactions.  In general, it may indicate 
investors‟ lack of confidence in financial markets or financial institutions.   
 
I attempt to confirm that equity prices reflect compensation to sellers for payment 
delays, as expected by theory and prior research.  Moreover, I am interested in whether 
that compensation is at the risk-free rate of return.  I expect to find the settlement period 
return is equal to the risk-free rate for the following reasons.  First, the payment delay is 
standard across all trades and reflects that security prices may be considered forward 
prices rather than spot prices since the transaction is actually settled three business 
days after the trade date.  Second, the payment delay was found to be compensated at 
the risk-free rate in prior work [DeGennaro (1990)] under a presumably more risky 
institutional framework.  If the processing system has become less risky, then it seems 
that the compensation for payment delays should not reflect a risk premium. 
 
I also incorporate data on delivery failures.  After a trade is executed, sellers may fail to 
deliver securities on time.  As opposed to payment delays, which are a certain 
consequence of the processing system, failures are a complication that may occur 
during the settlement cycle.  A failed delivery effectively becomes a forward transaction, 
regardless of whether the transaction involves broker-dealers (BDs) or institutions.  
Therefore, I predict that, in general, buyers compensate sellers at the risk-free rate over 
the extended settlement period. 
 
However, the expected effect on buyers varies depending on the circumstances and on 
the type of buyer.  Normally, individual investors are unaffected; they pay their BDs on 
the original settlement date, and they accrue all the benefits of ownership regardless of 
3 
 
when their BDs take delivery of the securities.  In abnormal circumstances, around 
periods of great uncertainty or financial crises for instance, individual investors may 
assess fails with more scrutiny and build a discount into prices.  These buyers may 
refuse to compensate sellers since they do not benefit from a forward contract.  In fact, 
they may require a lower price to acquire some of the benefit that their BD extracts from 
failed deliveries.  This outcome may signal a lack of confidence in a clearing firm or 
member to fulfill its obligation to deliver securities, not just on time, but perhaps, at any 
time in the future. 
 
Buyers‟ BDs may benefit from failed deliveries because they receive a forward 
transaction; additionally, they receive cash from their clients on the original settlement 
date.  Similarly, institutional investors may benefit from an extension of the payment 
delay since they, too, do not pay for securities until delivery.  However, buyers‟ BDs and 
institutions may lose out on the opportunity to lend a stock on special with a high 
specialness spread if the seller fails to deliver it. 
 
In sum, I investigate the following questions in this study.  How important is the 
settlement delay on security prices?  Do failures to deliver have an economically 
significant impact on prices?  Do equity prices reflect that failures to deliver benefit the 
buyer or the seller?  Has market structure stability been enhanced due to a safer 
processing system as a result of the central processing organization? 
 
In the next section, an overview of securities transactions processing is provided.  The 
third section describes short selling, failures to deliver, and Regulation SHO.  Section IV 
develops the model, and section V discusses the data.  The sixth section reports 
empirical results and discusses their implications.  Section VII concludes, and section 








II. Overview of Securities Transactions Processing 
 
When a buyer and seller enter into a sales agreement to exchange equity securities for 
cash, they make a trade.  Weiss (2006) discusses the period of time that follows in After 
the Trade is Made, focusing on the clearing, delivery, and settlement procedures.  
Clearing refers to all of the processes that occur after a trade is made except for the 
final settlement process.   Settlement is the last step and entails payment and delivery.  
On the date of the trade, called T, the buyer and seller agree to a price for the trade, but 
settlement actually occurs several days later.  Currently, it takes three business days to 
process equity transactions, and the length of the settlement cycle is commonly referred 
to as T+3.  Settlement cycles vary for different types of securities at present as shown in 
Table 1.  In the commercial paper market, transactions settle on the trade date, or T.  
Futures, options, and U.S. Treasury securities settle on T+1, and currency transactions 
settle on T+2.  Besides equities, corporate and municipal bonds also settle on T+3, or 
three business days after the trade date. 
 
Length of the Equities Settlement Cycle 
 
Equities settled on a T+4 time frame prior to February 1968.  Around that time, trading 
volume was heavier than the processing channels could accommodate, forcing the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to close periodically from 1967 through 1970.  Starting in 
August of 1967, intense back office workloads required early closure for a couple of 
weeks.  This was repeated for a substantial portion of the first quarter of 1968.  A major 
contributor to this problem was the physical transfer of stock certificates, which took too 
much time and was a drag on the efficiency of the financial system.  Consequently, to 
keep up with the paperwork, the time to process the sale or purchase of equity 
securities was lengthened.   
 
Table 1.  Present length of settlement cycle for various securities. 
Settlement Cycle Type of Security 
T 





U.S. Treasury securities 
T+2 currency or foreign exchange 
T+3 




On February 9, 1968, the processing time frame was extended by one business day to 
T+5 in response to this financial market paperwork crisis.  Even after the settlement 
timeframe was extended, backlogs of paperwork compelled the market to close all day 
on Wednesdays during the second half of 1968.  While the market reverted to a five day 
week at the beginning of 1969, it did not return to full trading hours until May 1970.   
 
The paperwork crisis highlighted how after-trade processes needed to be streamlined.  
A more modern approach would require clearing and settlement to be centralized and 
automated.  Physical stock certificates needed to be immobilized and kept in a central 
location.  Rather than delivering paper certificates, changes in ownership could simply 
be recorded by a depository.  As one solution to the NYSE paperwork crisis of the 
1960s, the Depository Trust Company (DTC) was created in 1973 as a central 
repository where paper certificates could be kept in one location and transfer of 
ownership could be enacted by record changes in a centralized database.  The process 
to transfer ownership is referred to as book entry.  DTC eliminated the need to 
physically transfer paper stock certificates, which alleviated the paperwork crisis.  The 
National Security Clearing Corporation (NSCC) followed in 1976 to fulfill the need for a 
central processing organization.  As discussed in detail in the section below describing 
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), NSCC manages back office 
settlement matters, including tracking information, comparing trade details, netting 
trades intrafirm,2 acting as central counterparty to both sides of a trade, and filling 
receives with delivers during settlement. 
 
Weiss (2006) discusses how financial leaders from around the world gathered in the 
mid-1980s to devise a list of process improvements, known as the G30 
recommendations, that would help financial markets deal with increased transaction 
volume due to market growth and globalization.  It called for netting trades on the street 
side3 of the trade as well as rolling unsettled trades – either fails to receive or fails to 
deliver – forward to the next day‟s settlement.  Although the increase to T+5 was 
necessary to accommodate the back office bottleneck, a longer settlement timeframe 
increases risk.  Therefore, additional recommendations included shortening the 
settlement cycle to T+3 on corporate securities and settlement in same-day funds, 
which are available immediately upon receipt. 
 
By the mid-1990s, these improvements had been made.  Processing had been 
automated and streamlined.  Few people were holding actual stock certificates.  In fact, 
most physical stock certificates had been replaced entirely by book entries in the 
computer database at the DTC.  Paperless securities are said to be dematerialized, 
                                            
2
 Netting, which is described in detail below, minimizes the number of receives and delivers between 
broker-dealer firms by pairing off transactions within each firm first. 
3
 The street side of the trade involves the processing portion of the trade that is carried out between the 
two opposing broker-dealers – one on the buy side and one on the sell side – involved in the trade.  This 
is in contrast to the client or customer side of the trade, which involves the parts of the trade that are 
carried out between the broker-dealer and his client. 
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which is the next logical step beyond immobilizing the stock certificate.  The system for 
processing equity transactions transitioned from T+5 to the current T+3 system on June 
7, 1995. 
 
In 2000, some members of the financial industry, including the DTCC, the Securities 
Industry Association (SIA), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
discussed shortening the settlement cycle for U.S. equities and corporate bonds from 
T+3 to T+1 by 2004.  Shorter settlement cycles have several benefits.  SIA anticipated 
that settlement exposure would decline dramatically, by 67% or $250 billion, in the 
move from T+3 to T+1.  Collateral put up by members of clearing corporations would 
also drop by 67% since members would have fewer open positions at any time.  Also, 
fewer pending settlements would decrease risk.  While SIA estimated the costs for the 
industry at about $8 billion with an annual savings of $2.7 billion per year after the 
transition, critics posited that the initial cost would be much higher.  In 2001, the target 
date for the transition was extended to 2005.  Priorities shifted after 9/11, and the costs 
to convert to a shorter time frame appeared to outweigh the benefits.  In 2002, the plan 
to shorten the settlement cycle was abandoned altogether.  However, European 
markets have recently revived the discussion, proposing to move from T+3 to T+2 and 
to join the German market that already settles on T+2.4  In turn, DTCC‟s CEO has 
publicized the need for discussion on shortening the settlement cycle in the U.S. equity 
market to alleviate systemic risk in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.5 
 
Types of Trades 
 
There are different types of investors.  The two main categories are individual investors 
and institutional investors.  While there are many more individual investors in the 
market, institutional investors manage portfolios that are enormously larger than those 
of individual investors.  Over the past decade, U.S. investments in equities are 
characterized by individuals holding an average of just under 40% of the outstanding 
market value and institutions holding the remaining 60% or so.6  The type of investor 
affects how trades are processed.  There is an important distinction between the two 
main types of trades:  trades between two BDs and institutional trades.   
 
Individuals must trade through retail channels and use the services of a broker or a 
dealer to accomplish their buying and selling.  Thus, individual investors‟ trades are 
always conducted with the aid of a BD, and all trades for individual investors that are 
                                            
4
 If you simultaneously buy equities in Germany, which will settle on T+2, and sell equities in another 
market that operates on T+3, you will experience a one business day shortfall in funds. 
5
 Source:  Donald F. Donahue, CEO and Chairman of DTCC in his June 2, 2010 speech entitled “Setting 
the Frame: Risk, Technology and Cooperation” in Wolfsberg, Switzerland. 
6
 Data used to calculate this estimate were obtained from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts, 
Release Z.1 Table L.213 Corporate Equities available at www.federalreserve.gov.  
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reported to a clearing agency are known as trades between two BDs, or broker-to-
broker trades.7   
 
An institutional trade, on the other hand, is generally more complex than retail trades 
between two BDs.  This is because they involve larger amounts of money and large 
blocks of securities, more parties to the transaction, and more steps between the initial 
entry of the order and the final settlement.8  In fact, the trade may take place entirely 
with another institution or it may be broken into smaller pieces to prevent greatly 
impacting prices.  Moreover, institutional trades may take place over multiple days.  
Similar to individual trades, institutional trades are still completed with the help of BDs.  
The specific details of settlement cycles for both types of trades are discussed below.  
 
BDs maintain positions in securities both for themselves or their firm and for their 
clients.  Clients‟ securities are often held in street name, meaning the BD holds the 
securities for these clients.  The BD is not the beneficial owner9 of the security; the 
client is.  BDs also trade for their own accounts.  However, these positions must be 
segregated from client positions.  In other words, BDs may not combine securities 
belonging to their clients with their own trading accounts or securities positions. 
 
Weiss (2006) further distinguishes the types of trades that BDs engage in with their 
clients, whether they are individuals or institutions.  These types of trades are 
summarized in Table 2.  In ordinary principal transactions, the BD fulfills a customer‟s 
order by buying or selling securities in the firm‟s trading account.  Since this is an 
internal transaction, the order is not processed by a clearing corporation.   
 
The remaining types of transactions are reported to and processed by a clearing 
corporation.  In market-maker transactions, the BD acts as a dealer in a security and 
buys or sells from his inventory to complete the customer order.  In an agency 
transaction, the BD takes on the role of an agent for the client and charges a 
commission on the purchase or sale of a security.  Finally, a modified principal 
transaction occurs when a customer‟s order is executed after the firm buys securities 
from a market-maker for the firm‟s internal trading account, charges a mark-up, and 
trades with the client as an ordinary principal.  Although this happens mostly for debt, it  
 
 
                                            
7
 An individual investor may also trade directly with his BD only in an ordinary principal transaction, as 
described below.  However, this would not be reported to the clearing agency. 
8
 Block trades, often used by institutional investors, involve selling 10,000 shares or more of a stock in 
one transaction.   
9
 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a beneficial owner of a security is a person with voting 
power (“the power to vote or direct the voting” of the security) and investment power (“the power to 
dispose or direct the disposition” of the security).  A national securities exchange member is not the 
beneficial owner if it holds securities on behalf of another person (directly or indirectly) and, as the record 
holder, is allowed to vote without instruction on matters that do not substantially alter the rights or 
privileges of the security holder. 
8 
 
Table 2.  Types of trades. 
Transaction Description 
Information Sent to 
Clearing 
Corporation10 
Ordinary Principal  Customer‟s order is executed against the 
trading account of the firm internally. 
Nothing. 
Market-Maker Dealer trades with customers or other 
non-dealer firms and profits from the bid-
ask spread. 
Details of the trade. 
Agency BD acts as an agent for the client and 
charges a commission.  
Details of the trade. 
Modified Principal Firm buys securities from a dealer, 
passes them through internal trading 
account, charges a mark-up, and 
proceeds as in an ordinary principal 
transaction. 
Details of the trade for 
firm‟s transaction with 





is occasionally used for equity transactions.  For instance, if the BD was a market-
maker when the client originally bought the security, then the client paid no commission 
fee.  If the BD no longer makes a market in the security when the client wants to sell at 
a later date, he may charge a mark-up rather than a commission to avoid upsetting the 




Securities were often purchased with checks in the past, forcing the seller to wait an 
additional business day for the check to clear before using the money.  The seller 
received “clearinghouse funds” on the settlement day; these funds earned no interest 
and were unavailable for use until the next business day when the money became 
Federal funds. Thus, early studies that explored payment delays to equity traders 
included an additional day to account for check clearing [e.g., see Lakonishok and Levi 
(1982) and DeGennaro (1990)].  
 
Presently, the money part of nearly all transactions between BDs is settled over 
Fedwire.  The Fedwire Funds Service is provided by the twelve Federal Reserve Banks 
as a communication network for real-time gross settlement.  Participating financial 
institutions with an account at a Federal Reserve Bank may initiate funds transfers 
online or by phone; money transferred is available to the recipient immediately.  
                                            
10
 All trades reported to the clearing corporation are also reported to the market and thus available in the 
data source for the study. 
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Members commonly use the service for payments that are high in value and time 
sensitive.  Fedwire is open Monday through Friday on non-holidays.  For a payment on 
any of these days of the week, transfers may be initiated anytime between 9:00 p.m. 
Eastern time on the calendar day preceding the payment day and 6:30 p.m. Eastern 
time on the payment day. 
 
According to Weiss (2006), prior to 1995, trades were settled with next-day funds, 
meaning the recipient could not use them until the next day.  However, in 1995, trades 
started settling with same-day funds, almost all of which were sent over Fedwire.  Note 
that both the BD and his client receive same-day funds on the settlement date.  In other 
words, there is no additional payment delay, beyond three business days, in this regime 
for the individual investor. 
 
According to the 2007 Check Sample Study, less than 20% of checks in 2006 were 
written for transactions over $500.11  These results are based on a sample of many 
large commercial banks that processed about 40% of all checks in the U.S. that year.  
Since most checks are written for values of $500 or less, this provides additional 
evidence that few trades are settled by check on either the street or client side. 
 
Even if clients use checks, they are subject to shorter payment processing times.  
Effective October 28, 2004, “Check 21” decreased the float time for personal checking 
by shortening the time for a check to clear.  Now, if an individual writes a check today, 
the Federal Reserve recommends that he have money in his account to cover that 
expense today.  The check clearing process has become much more efficient over time 
since banks can now transfer an image of a check electronically as opposed to 
physically delivering paper checks for payment.  Moreover, it is possible for a check to 
clear the same day as it is written; for example, if the payee presents the check at a 
branch of the bank from which the check is written, the payer‟s account may be debited 
that same day. 
 
However, check processing should not affect security prices.  While checks may be 
used by some clients of BDs, funds must be available in the account by the settlement 
date.  The buyer can continue to use his cash during the time from trade to settlement, 
but he must have assets in his account equal to the purchase value.  If the funds are not 
available by the settlement date, BDs have the authority to liquidate other assets to 
meet settlement obligations.12  Furthermore, clients receive same-day funds from BDs. 
 
 
                                            
11
 This survey is available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/ 
2007_check_sample_study.pdf. 
12
 A Vanguard Brokerage Services customer service broker provided this information in the fall of 2009. 
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The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
 
Billions of shares of securities are traded on a daily basis in the U.S.  As the largest 
organization in the world that provides post-trade infrastructure to financial markets, the 
DTCC processes most of these trades.  The DTCC and its subsidiaries provide clearing, 
settlement, and information services.  Securities settled through DTCC in 2008 were 
valued at $1.88 quadrillion.13  Of its seven subsidiaries, the divisions that clear and 
settle equity transactions include the NSCC and the DTC.  NSCC exists to speed up 
settlement of equity and corporate and municipal debt transactions for securities listed 
on the NYSE, American Stock Exchange (Amex)14, and NASDAQ.  DTC tracks changes 
in ownership and allows for immobilization of physical stock certificates and book-entry.   
 
In 2008, the NSCC processed over $315 trillion in equity and bond transactions.  This 
consisted of nearly 22 billion transactions, or an average of about 88 million 
transactions per day.  Table 3 shows the growth in annual transaction statistics from 
DTCC, NSCC, and the SEC.  DTCC data includes settlement of securities for all of its 
subsidiaries.  NSCC data includes both the dollar value and the volume of equity and 
corporate and municipal bond transactions processed by NSCC.  SEC data shows the 
dollar value of all equity transactions in the market.  Figure 1 show the growth in equity 
transactions reported by the SEC in dollars. 
 
Some considerations regarding the NSCC and SEC statistics are necessary.  
Characteristics of the data make comparisons difficult.  NSCC figures count the buy 
side and sell side separately; in other words, NSCC double counts.15  The SEC reports 
the market value of all sales of equities, so the SEC data should be compared to half 
the NSCC data.  After adjusting, the SEC values are much lower.  In fact, the halved 
NSCC values exceed the reported SEC values by the following:  2.00 times16 in 2008, 
2.24 times in 2007, 2.09 times in 2006, 1.97 times in 2005, and 1.85 times in 2004.   
 
NSCC reports statistics for corporate and municipal bonds as well as equities while the 
SEC reports the value for equities only, suggesting that NSCC values should be higher 
due to the inclusion of bonds.  The NSCC does not report statistics for equities alone.  
Conversely, the SEC equity values include institutional trades whereas the NSCC only 
reports trades between two BDs.  The SEC does not report statistics for trades between  
  
                                            
13
 All statistics in this section are from the DTCC website at www.dtcc.com/about/business/statistics.php. 
14
 According to http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_chronology_index.html, NYSE and 
Archipelago Holdings, Inc. merged March 7, 2006 to form the NYSE Group, Inc.  On April 4, 2007, NYSE 
Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V. merge to form NYSE Euronext.  NYSE Euronext acquired Amex on 
October 1, 2008. 
15
 Source:  DTCC Media Statement from June 28, 2006 “DTCC Clarification on Fails to Deliver.” 
16
 Calculated as ($315.1 trillion ÷ 2) ÷ $78.7 trillion. 
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Table 3.  Transaction statistics from DTCC,17 NSCC,18 and the SEC.19 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
DTCC Transactions 
Total Value ($) 1.1 Q 1.4 Q 1.53 Q 1.86 Q 1.88 Q 1.48 Q 
NSCC Equity and Bond Transactions 
Value ($) 
Total 100.4 T 130.7 T 174.9 T 283.2 T 315.1 T 209.7 T 
Daily Average 402 B 523 B 700 B 1,137 B 1,255 B 835 B 
Peak Day 494 B 765 B 1,020 B 2,230 B 3,273 B n/a 
Volume (# of Transactions) 
Total 5.8 Ba 6.6 B 8.5 B 13.5 B 21.9 B 23.2 B 
Daily Average 23 M 26 M 34 M 54 M 87 M 92 M 
Peak Day 30 M 37 M 50 M 99 M 209 Mb n/a 
Date of Peak May 10 Oct 6 June 8 Aug 16 Oct 10 n/ac 
SEC Equity Transactions 
Value ($) 
Total 27.2 T 33.2 T 41.8 T 63.1 T 78.7 T n/a 
NYSE 11.7 T 14.4 T 16.3 T 17.3 T 12.8 T n/a 
NASDAQ 8.0 T 10.4 T 17.8 Td 17.1 T 25.0 T n/a 
Daily Average 109 B 133 B 167 B 252 B 315 B n/a 
 
Q = quadrillion (10
15
); T = trillion (10
12
); B = billion (10
9
); M = million (10
6
) 
Daily average statistics assume 250 trading days per year. 
a




 The 2008 DTCC Annual Report states 19.3 billion shares were processed (averaging 92 
shares/transaction).  In opposition, the 2009 DTCC Annual Report states 85.7 billion shares were 
processed on October 10, 2008 (averaging 409 shares/transaction). 
c
 DTCC reports no new peak day in 2009 for NSCC transactions, but it does report a peak day for number 
of shares processed.  On August 24, 2009, 96.7 billion shares were processed. 
d
 Includes $2.4T from NASDAQ and $15.4T from NASD, reported separately in this year only. 
                                            
17
 Data obtained from DTCC annual reports. 
18
 Data obtained from DTCC annual reports.  The values reported are prior to netting.  For example, 
NSCC processed $315.1 trillion in transactions in 2008 prior to netting.  Netting reduced trade obligations 
by over 99% to $2.9 trillion.  In addition, the DTCC value and volume measures double count all trades to 
include both the buy side and sell side. 
19
 Data obtained from Select SEC and Market Data 2004-2009 available on www.sec.gov/about.shtml. 
20
 The size of the average equity trade was 836 shares in 2003, 780 shares in 2001, and 758 shares in 




The market value of equity sales is reported.  „Other‟ includes trades reported by some combination of 
exchanges, regulatory agencies, and electronic marketplaces, such as the American Stock Exchange 
(Amex), Archipelago Exchange, BATS Exchange, Inc., Chicago Stock Exchange, Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
21
, International Securities Exchange, National Stock Exchange, Pacific 
Exchange, and Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 
Figure 1.  SEC-reported value of equity transactions in trillions of dollars. 
 
two BDs alone.  From 2004 to 2009, institutional block trades accounted for around 16% 
of the dollar volume of all trades on average.22  In 2008, the $79 trillion reported by the 
SEC is made up of 10% average dollar volume of institutional trades in that year, or 
about $8 trillion.  The remaining $71 trillion in trades may have been reported to NSCC 
as trades between two BDs.  This suggests that NSCC reports 220% ($158T / $71T), 
rather than 200% as calculated earlier, of the value reported by the SEC when 
institutional trades are excluded from the SEC data. 
 
Members of DTCC paid fees for equity clearing that amounted to about a third of a cent 
for each transaction in 2008, or under seven hundredths of a penny for each 100 shares 
                                            
21
 According to http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_chronology_index.html, NASD and NYSE 
Regulation combined to form FINRA in July 2007. 
22
 This calculation is based on the percentage obtained when NYSE Group block volume in NYSE listed 
securities is divided by all NYSE group volume in NYSE listed securities on a monthly basis from January 
2004 to December 2009.  The average was 20% for share volume, 0% for number of trades, and 16% for 
dollar volume.  Average share volume declined over time from 27% (2004-06 data) to 14% (2007-09 
data).  Prior to this sample, Francis and Ibbotson (2002), report that block trades accounted for over 50% 
of NYSE share volume in 1997.  The SIA reports that in 2001 the average daily number of institutional 

















on average.23  From 2006-2008, the number of U.S. equities transactions processed by 
NSCC doubled, yet annual expenses were constant at $100 million per year.  Members 
pay fees to reimburse DTCC for its services.  Based on their usage, costs are split 
proportionally between members.  The DTCC attempts to price its services to cover its 
costs and returns excess revenues to members in the form of discounts and other 
refunds.  Profits are also distributed to members, who are obligatory preferred 
shareholders, in the form of dividends. 
 
The DTC had nearly $28 trillion worth of securities on deposit in 2008.  When securities 
are not in the depository, they may be in BD vaults, custodial banks, in transfer, or out 
on stock or bank loan.  Also, investors today can still hold securities in the form of 
physical certificates.  If they do so, the security is registered with the issuing firm in the 
investor‟s name.  As proof of ownership, the investor receives a tangible security 
certificate.  In 2000, the SIA reported its survey of individual investors who had 
requested securities in certificate form in the recent past.  These individuals had the 
following characteristics.  Most were over the age of 55, had at least ten years of 
investing experience, and traded infrequently on a monthly basis.  Around half owned a 
computer and used the Internet; a similar proportion said they would still invest without 
certificates.  The SIA concluded that some investors still covet the physical security 
certificate.  However, this group includes few investors under 55, suggesting that most 
investors are likely to accept dematerialization over time. 
 
If no physical certificate is issued, ownership is documented by book-entry, either by 
street name registration through a BD or by direct registration through the issuing firm or 
its transfer agent.  Street name registration means that the issuing firm records the 
investor‟s BD firm as the owner, and the BD records that the investor is the beneficial 
owner.  Direct registration means that the issuing firm records the investor as the owner. 
 
Most investors are willing to hold dematerialized securities in street name with their BD.  
Similarly, most clients‟ security positions are maintained by their BDs at DTC.  BDs 
often keep all of their equities, corporate and municipal debt, and money market 
securities at DTC.  The client is the beneficial owner of the security, but the securities 
are registered in street name.  Equities held in street name are referred to as fungible 
and can be substituted.  This means that if a particular share of stock is lent out, it must 
be replaced with another equivalent share of stock of the same issuing company; it 
does not have to be replaced with the exact same share.  DTC carries securities in its 
street name, CEDE, which stands for Central Depository. 
 
                                            
23
 The cost to clear a trade has fallen substantially.  Historically, the cost per side has been: 82 cents in 
1977, 35 cents in 1983, 7 cents in 2001, 4.7 cents in 2002, 4.3 cents in 2004.  Source for statistics for 
1977 and 2004:  Jill M. Considine, CEO and Chairman of DTCC in November 1, 2004 speech at the 8
th
 
Asia-Pacific CSD Group annual meeting, “Building a Flexible Model for the Future; Making Organizations 
Responsive.”  Source for statistics for 1983, 2002, and 2008:  2008 DTCC Annual Report.  Source for the 
2001 statistic:  2001 DTCC Annual Report. 
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When a client wants his securities registered in his own name rather than in street 
name, the securities held in the beneficial owner‟s name must be paid for in full.  The 
client can either take possession of the shares himself or ask the BD to hold the 
securities.  When the BD keeps the shares registered in his client‟s name, this is a 
service referred to as safekeeping and carries a fee.  Since these shares cannot be 
purchased on margin, they are not available for lending to short sellers.  In fact, the BD 
may not use them for any purpose.  Therefore, the safekeeping fee compensates the 
BD for carrying, storage, and records associated with keeping the shares in a separate 
account.  If the client takes possession of the shares registered in his name rather than 
safekeeping, then he does not incur the fee.  However, selling the shares may take 
more time since the client will have to deliver them to his BD. 
 
When stock is registered in street name, it can be maintained electronically, accepted 
as a good delivery at any BD or bank, and used by the BD to conduct daily business.  
Moreover, a client will receive the proceeds of a sale faster for a stock registered in 
street name than for a stock held in the client‟s own name since he does not have to 
wait until the stock clears transfer.  For a stock registered in street name, the client will 
receive the proceeds of the sale on the settlement date, or T+3.  For a stock registered 
in the client‟s name, the client may not receive the proceeds of the sale on T+3; he may 
have to wait longer because he must present a power of attorney document that 
transfers ownership from himself to the BD in street name.  Once ownership is 
transferred, the client will receive the proceeds of the sale. 
 




The initial step in the settlement cycle is the comparison of trade details between the 
opposing parties to the trade.  Within seconds after the trade is executed, the details 
must be submitted and compared.  The reporting party is generally the sell side.  
However, if the sell side is a broker and the buy side is a dealer, then the dealer reports.  
The non-reporting party must accept the terms of the trade in order for it to be 
processed and for details to be forwarded on to a clearing corporation, like NSCC.  On 
the NYSE, BDs use the Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system.  For NASDAQ, 
BDs use the Automated Confirmation Transaction (ACT) system. 
 
Nearly every trade that is submitted to NSCC these days has been compared by the 
two BDs involved in the trade.  This makes it easy for the clearing corporation to 
produce a contract sheet as an electronic record.  If the BDs are both participants at 
NSCC, known as clearing firms, then they receive this computer-generated report, 
which highlights all of their compared trades (both sides match), uncompared trades 
(the BD‟s submission does not match the other side), and advisory trades (the BD does 
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not know about the other side‟s submission.)  BDs investigate and clean up 
uncompared and advisory trades as quickly as possible. 
 
The evolution of the comparison process helped make clearing more efficient.  In the 
past, comparison of trade details was cumbersome and full of errors.  Both BDs were 
required to present all of the details of their trades to the clearing corporation, including 
trade date, quantity, security, price, first money (quantity times price), and the name of 
the other broker.  The details were initially recorded on an exchange floor report or in 
the trader‟s handwritten notes.  Another individual in a different department of the BD 
firm who had no involvement in the trade would transcribe this report or the notes to 
prepare a comparison form.  Then, the clearing corporation would match the data, 
compare it, and send a contract sheet report back to both BDs who would verify the 
details.  This was inefficient and too time consuming for a T+3 settlement cycle.  
 
As technology improved, the BDs could electronically submit their trade details to the 
clearing corporations, cutting out the uninvolved individual at the BD.  However, an 
individual at the clearing corporation prepared the data for the contract sheets to 
compare the sell side and the buy side, and the process was still riddled with errors.  
Eventually, the modern order match systems, which eliminated these problems and 
many of the resulting errors, were adopted.  Weiss (2006) estimates that with these 
improvements in the processing, 99% of trades will go through both the clearing 




After comparison, NSCC nets trades.  Netting drastically reduces the number of 
receives and deliveries between firms.  All trades on a particular day in a particular 
security vary only in the prices at which they were executed, or the contract prices, and 
the size of the trade, or the number of shares.  The contract prices are observed and 
recorded in the market.  The clearing corporation removes the price differences through 
the use of the Clearing Cash Adjustment (CCA).  The clearing corporation chooses a 
uniform settlement price for all trades that occurred that day.  The settlement price could 
be any reasonable price, such as the first, last, or average price of the day.  As opposed 
to the contract price, the settlement price is not reported to the market; instead, it is 
used internally to transfer money between members of the clearing corporation with 
open trades.  The settlement price homogenizes trades, or makes them the same.  It 
allows every party that traded in that security on that day to trade share-for-share at the 
settlement price, while the CCA allows for different contract prices. 
 
Consider the simplified situation in Figure 2 that shows all trades in Stock X on a 
particular day, which is based on a similar example by Weiss (2006).  Assume only six 
BDs trade on the current day; ignore commissions and taxes.  Without netting, the five 
trades require five receives and five delivers interfirm, meaning between BD firms.  With  
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Stock X Transactions Today (T) 
 
 
A.  Before Netting 
 
All Trades 
Arrows show the flow of shares. 
Financial Obligations 




B.  With Netting 
 
Netted Trades 
Arrow shows the flow of shares. 
Financial Obligations 




Figure 2.  Example of netting decreasing receives and delivers.  
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netting, the number of interfirm receives and delivers is reduced to one receive and one 
deliver.  The reduction is the result of intrafirm netting, or matching receives and 
delivers between the clients at a particular BD firm.  The remaining obligations are 
fulfilled by transferring CCA money through the clearing corporation. 
 
For example, BD2 had two clients trade in Stock X today.  Although they did not trade 
with one another, their positions offset one another at the firm.  If both investors keep 
their stocks registered in street name, then there is no transfer of ownership on the 
issuer‟s books.  The stock remains registered to BD2, who is responsible for recording 
the transfer of ownership to the new owner on his firm‟s books.  The same intrafirm 
netting occurs for BD3, BD4, and BD5.  Whereas both clients at BD2 had the same 
contract price, the clients of BD3, BD4, and BD5 had different contract prices.  Thus, 
they also need to move money between clients‟ accounts to complete the trade.   
 
Netting leaves only one interfirm transfer of securities at the settlement price between 
BD1 and BD6 that will occur on T+3.  In essence, BD1 delivers a round lot, or 100 
shares, of Stock X to BD6 for $2,000 on the settlement day.  Note, too, that the clients 
of these BDs did not trade with one another, but under the netting process, these BDs 
had nonzero net positions in the security on the current trading day. 
 
Notice that the settlement price on the current day is $20.  Therefore, BD1 pays $100 in 
CCA to the clearing corporation today.  This is because the settlement price is 
$20/share; for 100 shares, the selling BD will receive $2,000 at settlement.  However, at 
a contract price of $19/share, the selling BD should receive only $1,900.  To correct for 
this, he pays the difference of $100.  Similarly, both BD3 and BD5 pay $200.  BD2 has 
no monetary transfer.  BD4 is paid $300, and BD6 is paid $200.  The sum of the 
amounts paid ($500) by BD1, BD3, and BD5 is exactly equal to the sum of the amounts 
paid ($500) to BD4 and BD6.  According to the DTCC, netting reduces financial 
obligations in dollars by over 95% on average. 
 
At this point, the clearing corporation acts as a central counterparty (CCP) to both sides 
of the trade by taking its place between the buying and selling firms.  NSCC guarantees 
settlement of all transactions entered into its netting system; it takes on the risk 
associated with the buyer‟s credit and with the seller‟s delivery.  If either the buyer or 
seller to the trade fails, NSCC assumes the obligations of that party and attempts to 
complete open receives or delivers via market action.  However, the time frame in which 
the outstanding obligation is fulfilled is not guaranteed by NSCC.  The assurance is only 
that the obligation will be carried out if a firm fails.24 
 
Both NSCC and DTC are subject to credit risk when NSCC guarantees both sides of the 
trade.  DTCC takes many steps to alleviate this risk.  In order to become members of 
the clearing corporation, participants have to meet outlined financial standards.  
                                            
24
 This is based on www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2006/finnerty.php. 
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Established members must also comply with financial standards to maintain 
membership; the clearing corporation monitors the financial position and trading activity 
of members.  It obligates them to mark outstanding positions to market on a daily basis.  
Additionally, members of DTCC are required to have a minority interest in the firm by 
holding shares of preferred stock; this helps to align the interests of the members with 
the performance and sustainability of DTCC.  Finally, all members must deposit 
participant funds with the clearing corporation.  These deposits include some 
combination of cash, marketable securities, and letters of credit. 
 
The participant‟s clearing fund account provides a cushion of protection to the clearing 
corporation in the event that a participant goes out of business.  It also allows the firm to 
meet its daily requirements for settling trades and for margin obligations.  The amount of 
this collateral depends on the BD‟s level of trading.  The clearing fund is composed of 
two parts.  The first part is static; since the amount does not change much over time, 
BDs often meet this requirement by depositing U.S. Treasury bills.  The second part is 
dynamic, changing daily based on current settlement needs.  BDs meet this 
requirement by depositing a bank‟s letter of credit, which guarantees the bank is willing 
to lend a certain amount of money on demand.  Therefore, the BD does not have to 
obtain financing on a daily basis.  The clearing corporation uses the letter of credit to 
obtain the funds necessary for the BDs daily settlement activity.  The BD is charged a 
nominal commitment fee for access to the credit line apart from use.  The actual loan 
rate is charged on amounts paid to the clearing corporation. 
 
According to the 2008 DTCC Annual Report, NSCC required participants to have 
clearing fund deposits to meet obligations and liabilities, based on respective activity 
levels, totaling $36.44 billion at the end of 2008.  However, member firms had an 
excess on deposit at year end of nearly $10.83 billion.  Subsequently, total deposits 
summed to approximately $47.27 billion on December 31, 2008. 
 
DTC intends to stop member transactions that would cause a debit in excess of the total 
amount of collateral in its clearing funds account.  If a member of the clearing 
corporation becomes insolvent, its account should have enough funds that, if liquidated, 
these funds would pay for its failed settlement obligations.  When a member fails, NSCC 
can choose to discontinue acting on behalf of the member.  The member‟s obligations 
are then liquidated, and any deposits for margin, marking to market, and participant 
funds will be used to complete unsettled obligations and losses.  Furthermore, the 
various subsidiaries of DTCC work together to close out open positions of the failing 
member.  Excess funds are used first, but if the collateral does not cover the balance, 
then the subsidiaries will follow outlined rules to offset losses with retained earnings of 
the corporation.  Clearly, the outcome depends on the specifics of the case. 
 
This process was used in 2008 to close out obligations of Lehman Brothers Inc., one 
member that ranked in the top ten for utilization of NSCC and DTC services at the time, 
as described in the 2008 DTCC Annual Report.  The trustee charged with liquidating 
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Lehman began work on September 19.  Lehman failed to settle on September 23, so 
DTCC subsidiaries stopped acting on the firm‟s behalf on September 24.  DTCC 
announced that all of Lehman‟s open positions were closed out by October 30 without 
any loss to DTCC or the members‟ clearing funds.  While NSCC was able to fulfill its 
guarantee that all obligations would be carried out if a firm fails, it took just over a month 
after Lehman first failed to settle for the clearing corporation to provide this service. 
 
Continuous Net Settlement 
 
Before continuous net settlement (CNS), fails stayed open until the selling BD delivered 
to the buying one.  As a result, the number of open fails grew in the 1960s and 
substantially contributed to the paperwork crisis at that time.  The physical transfer of 
stock certificates prevailed before DTC was created as the central depository.  While 
the Stock Clearing Corporation (SCC), the predecessor of NSCC, informed BDs to 
deliver stock to buying BDs and to receive stock from selling BDs, only the two sides to 
the trade knew whether delivery had occurred or failed.  These were bilateral 
obligations, meaning that the party waiting to receive delivery would only be satisfied 
when delivery was fulfilled by the specific party from the trade on that particular day.   
 
Fails to deliver are the defining feature of the CNS process.  CNS occurs when fails to 
deliver are rolled into the next day‟s settlement trades.  If net settlement were not 
continuous, then fails would remain outstanding for longer on average because the fail 
would become a bilateral obligation.  However, in CNS, the fail is not a bilateral 
contract.  Often, a particular fail to receive on one day will be fulfilled soon after, even 
the next day.  This may be accomplished either by intrafirm netting or by the NSCC‟s 
policy of filling the oldest receive positions first, which essentially transfers the fail to 
another BD.  When one BD fails to deliver securities, the fail roles forward onto the next 
day‟s settlement schedule as an open position at the prior day‟s settlement price.  The 
position is marked to market daily as long as it is open.  For regulatory reasons, fail 
positions are called open trades. 
 
Rolling the previous day‟s fails onto today‟s settlement schedule both lowers the 
number of open items that can be outstanding at any point in time and allows open 
items to reflect current market value by marking open fail positions to market.  Consider 
the netting example at time T from Figure 2 again.  Suppose that BD1 fails to deliver 
100 shares of Stock X to BD6 on the settlement date, at T+3.  Under CNS, the fail, or 
open position, would roll forward to T+4 for netting.25   
 
Figure 3 gives an example of CNS.  (A) shows the open positions from T after all trades 
have been netted from Figure 2.  The contract price is replaced with the settlement price  
                                            
25
 Throughout the discussion, the “T+x” notation refers to the original trade day from the example in 





A.  Open Positions in Stock X on T after Netting 
 
On T+3, BD1 fails to deliver 100 shares at the settlement price on T of $20/share to BD6.   
The fail rolls to T+4. 
 
B.  Stock X Transactions on T+4 
 
 
Without CNS, netting would result in one deliver obligation from BD6 to BD4. 
 
C.  Open Positions in Stock X on T+4 for Netting with CNS 
 
The open position rolled forward from T+3 is highlighted. 
 
D.  Open Positions in Stock X on T+4 after Netting 
 
 
The settlement price of $20 on T+4 is reflected after netting. 
 
 




on T after the CCA is paid.  Remaining obligations from this day are for BD1 to deliver 
100 shares of Stock X to BD6 in exchange for $2,000 on T+3.  When BD1 fails to 
deliver, no stock or money changes hands through the clearing corporation. 
 
The trades in Stock X that occurred on T+4 are shown in (B).  Without CNS, the fail 
would remain a bilateral agreement between BD1 and BD6 and would not appear as an 
open position.  Netting would occur entirely intrafirm for BD2 and BD5.  BD4 would net 
two of its trades internally.  The net transfer of stock from this day would be for BD6 to 
deliver 100 shares of Stock X to BD4 on T+7.  Yet, as a consequence of BD1 failing to 
deliver to BD6 on T+3, BD6 might fail to deliver to BD4, exacerbating the problem.  
Conversely, with CNS, the failed delivery rolls onto T+4‟s open positions at the 
settlement price from T for netting, as shown by the highlighted entries in (C).  Now, 
netting occurs entirely intrafirm for BD2, BD5, and BD6 because each has offsetting 
transactions within the firm that are netted against one another.  Therefore, BD6‟s T+3 
fail to receive is fulfilled through intrafirm netting on T+4. 
 
As shown in (D), after BD4 nets two of its trades internally, the remaining obligations on 
T+4 are for BD1 to deliver 100 shares of Stock X to BD4 for $2,000 on T+7.  Delivery is 
at the T+4 settlement price of $20/share; coincidentally, this is the same as on T.  If BD1 
delivers on T+7, there is no further open position.  If BD1 does not deliver, its fail to 
deliver and BD4‟s fail to receive will roll forward as open positions on T+8.  A fail to 
receive can be thought of as an accounts payable since the shares have not been 
received and payment has not been made.  The purchasing BD does not pay for the 
shares until received; however, the BD‟s client has generally already paid for them and 
is not notified of the failed delivery.   
 
In other words, the purchasing BD gains the float until the position is fulfilled, which is a 
benefit to him because he can earn interest on the funds that he debits from his client‟s 
account on the settlement date.  If the client makes the purchase from a cash account, 
his BD earns interest on the total price of the transaction.  If the client makes the 
purchase from a margin account, the BD charges the client interest on the loan.  He 
also earns interest on the portion of cash put up by the client, which is in place of any 
interest that he could have earned from loaning the stock had it been delivered.  The 
client does not benefit from this situation, but it is not detrimental to him under normal 
circumstances, either.  It could be problematic, however, if a major brokerage firm or 
clearing corporation became insolvent before the stock was delivered.  In times of crisis, 
buyers may anticipate extended settlement periods associated with failed delivery and 
discount security prices accordingly, which would decrease returns to the seller.  Buyers 
may offer lower prices to extract some of the benefit that their BDs obtain from failed 
deliveries.  This would signal a lack of confidence in financial institutions, like a clearing 
corporation or one of its major member firms, to fulfill obligations to deliver securities in 




Since NSCC acts as CCP and nets trades using CNS, BDs with net positions to buy or 
sell cannot accurately identify the opposite party to the trade.  In other words, net buying 
BDs do not know with certainty which selling BD is going to deliver securities to it at 
settlement, and net selling BDs do not know which buying BD will pay at settlement.  It 
does not have to be, and likely is not, the party with whom the BD traded.  In the 
examples above, BD1 originally sells to BD2 in a trade executed on day T.  Yet, in the 
first case in Figure 2, BD1 is scheduled to deliver shares to BD6.  After BD1 fails to 
deliver to BD6 on T+3, Figure 3 shows that BD1 is supposed to deliver shares to BD4. 
 
There is a difference between a BD firm failing to deliver and the client of a BD failing to 
deliver.  If a BD fails to deliver securities, he should deliver as quickly as possible.  If a 
BD fails to receive securities, the open position is marked to market to minimize risk for 
the CCP by allowing clearing fund deposits to adjust and compensate for changes in 
security values on a daily basis.  On the other hand, if a client breaches his obligation, 
the BD must still fulfill the commitment.  In other words, if a client fails to deliver a 
security or to make a payment to his BD, the BD is not excused from delivering the 
security or the cash to the opposing BD with whom the trade was made.  This 
represents risk to the BD and explains why BDs have the authority to liquidate other 
assets in a client‟s account to meet settlement obligations. 
 
Infrequently, a client may enter into an equity transaction and find himself in a situation 
beyond his control that prevents him from satisfying his obligation in the trade by the 
settlement day.  The client may be unable to pay for the purchase of a security or 
unable to deliver to the buyer.  Weiss (2006) points out a grace period after the 
settlement date that allows the client to remedy the situation under extreme 
circumstances.  Clients‟ trades are supposed to be paid for fully by settlement day but 
must be paid for no later than two business days after that.  After two business days, 
the BD may request an extension for the client from the NASD‟s regulatory division; 
each client is allowed up to five extensions per year.  If granted, the client is given 
additional time.  If not, the BD must close out the transaction.  The BD liquidates, or 
„sells out,‟ the purchased security if the client fails to pay for it, and the firm „buys in‟ the 
security for an unfulfilled sale.  Generally, the BD is fulfilling the obligation at a loss and 




At this point, NSCC has compared and netted trades.  The comparison process 
confirms trade details.  The netting process minimizes the number of interfirm receives 
and delivers by pairing off transactions within a firm.  Through CNS, open transactions 
are rolled into the next day‟s trades and netted intrafirm again to minimize fails. 
 
Next, transactions are ready for the settlement cycle.  In the current T+3 system, the 
actual settlement cycle starts the evening before settlement, on T+2.  This night cycle, 
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called PDQ for “pretty darn quick,” consists of an exchange of information between DTC 
and NSCC and embodies the majority of settlement.  NSCC prepares a projection 
report that shows trades pending settlement, consisting of all of the net securities 
positions that are due to be settled.  Net sellers deliver securities, while net buyers 
receive securities. 
 
Early in the evening of T+2, BDs tell DTC which securities can and cannot be used for 
settlement on T+3.  Some securities are not available for settlement because they are 
“locked up in seg” under the segregation requirement of SEC Regulation T.  This 
dictates that all securities in cash accounts and a portion of those in margin accounts 
must be held or controlled by the firm acting as custodian of those accounts at all times.  
DTC notes the quantity of each security that is available for settlement at each BD. 
 
Later in the evening of T+2, NSCC tells DTC which BDs are net sellers and how many 
shares they owe.  Next, DTC compares the quantity of shares each seller owes to the 
quantity the seller has available for settlement.  If there are enough shares to fulfill the 
entire obligation, that quantity is transferred out of their account electronically.  
Otherwise, the shares available for settlement are taken for partial delivery.  Rather than 
crediting the net buyers directly, DTC credits the securities to NSCC‟s omnibus account.  
Then, NSCC distributes the shares to net buyers in chronological order with the oldest 
receive position filled first.  This concludes the PDQ cycle. 
 
On the morning of T+3, the mainline cycle begins.  NSCC produces another projection 
report that shows trades still open for settlement and trades that are due to settle the 
following day, on T+4.  Money is paid to net sellers as buying BDs give orders to their 
settling banks to send funds. 
 
Timeline for the Settlement Cycle 
 
The settlement cycle starts on the trade date with comparison of trade details.  As 
submitted trade details have already been confirmed by both BDs, the NSCC‟s resulting 
report signifies that the trade is now moving through the processing stream.  At midnight 
between T+1 and T+2, netting occurs, and NSCC becomes the central counterparty to 
all trades.  Legally, NSCC does not promise its trade guarantee until 36 hours or more 
after the trade.26  On the evening of T+2, settlement starts with the communication 
between NSCC and DTC in the PDQ.  On T+3, net buyers receive confirmation that 
securities have been obtained through book-entry transfers, and net sellers receive 
funds via Fedwire. 
 
                                            
26
 Source:  Donald F. Donahue, CEO and Chairman of DTCC in his October 28, 2009 keynote speech at 
the DTCC Executive Form in NYC. 
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Settlement Cycle for Institutional Trades 
 
Large trades made by institutional investors are processed via a different system but on 
the same timeline.  Instead of NSCC clearing these transactions, institutional orders are 
entered and handled on Omgeo, which is a joint product that combines Thomson 
Financial‟s OASYS and DTCC‟s TradeSuite.  This system handles the entire process of 
the settlement cycle, including transmitting data electronically and book entry 
settlement.  Institutional trades processed in this manner are reported to the market and 
thus available in the index return data used in this study. 
 
Institutions are commonly represented by a custodian bank, which must be a member of 
a national depository, like DTC.  Institutional trades are settled on a delivery versus 
payment (DVP) basis.  If the institution is buying securities, it pays for the purchase 
when the securities are delivered to its custodian bank.  Similarly, in a sale, money is 
not exchanged until the institution‟s custodian bank delivers the sold securities to the 
opposing party.  Delivery is achieved at the depository through a bookkeeping entry.  
Again, settlement occurs on T+3.   
 
If an institutional investor buys stock and the seller does not deliver it on T+3, then by 
the DVP process, the institution retains its cash until delivery occurs.  This benefits the 
purchasing institution because the fail extends a forward contract to the buyer.  Fails by 
institutions are not available in the fails data source for this study, discussed in detail 
below, because the transactions are not processed by NSCC.  The available fail to 




The contemporary security processing system described in the preceding sections 
attempts to make financial markets safer by reducing counterparty risk.  However, some 
equity transactions are not processed through this system.  The SEC defines an ex-
clearing transaction as “a sale of a security that clears and settles otherwise than 
through a designated clearing agency.”  No data are available relating to the size or 
scope of this practice.   
 
The DTCC has not been able to track trades or fails in ex-clearing since those 
transactions are settled outside of its system.  Cosgrove (2009), the DTCC‟s Managing 
Director of Clearance and Settlement/Equities, describes ex-clearing trades as 
“managed broker-to-broker using highly manual and error-prone processes, including 
phone calls and faxes to exchange information to ensure final settlement.”   
 
Although there are currently no data available to illuminate how many ex-clearing trades 
or fails occur, there is a potential solution on the horizon.  In late November 2010, the 
NSCC began testing of Obligation Warehouse (OW), a new system to track ex-clearing.  
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OW summarizes and discloses trading activity and highlights outstanding fails in the ex-
clearing channel.  Although OW does not provide the NSCC‟s trade guarantee, it may 
alleviate some of the risk of persistent fails in the ex-clearing channel because it may 
increase transparency.  OW allows failed trades to become observable to market 
participants beyond the two sides of the trade.  However, use of this system is not 
mandatory, and it is unclear whether BDs partaking in these transactions will elect to 
report to OW. 
 
Prior Studies Relating to Settlement Cycles 
 
Prior empirical studies investigate settlement effects on equity returns.  Many are from a 
previous institutional structure and focus on factors that influence day of the week 
effects.  An early study, French (1980), considers the day of the week effect in terms of 
calendar time versus trading time.  Based on calendar time, Monday returns should be 
three times on average the return on every other day of the week.  Trading time 
assumptions suppose that returns are dependent on when the markets are open; 
therefore, the return should not depend on the day of the week.  Using the daily S&P 
composite index from 1953 to 1977, the study finds that neither model is correct.  In 
fact, returns are positive on all days of the week except Monday, when returns are 
significantly negative.  While French (1980) did not consider settlement effects, these 
surprising results prompted research to provide explanations, and several researchers 
suggested that the processing of equity securities may clarify these findings. 
 
Gibbons and Hess (1981) use daily data from 1962 to 1978 covering the S&P 500 index 
and the CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted indices.  Since these indices display 
autocorrelation, which they attribute to thin trading, they also study the 30 stocks in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average.  They find strongly negative and persistent Monday 
returns for equities.  They continue their study with Treasury bills to see whether this 
finding is consistent across other asset classes.  Again, they observe low Monday 
returns for T-bills.  They investigate whether settlement can explain the day of the week 
effect but find no support for this or any other explanation.  Yet, their methodology for 
investigating the effect of payment delay is limited by their inability to obtain daily 
interest rate data at the time the study was conducted. Also, they do not account for 
payment delays due to check clearing.  They argue that a negative Monday return 
should be compensated by a Tuesday return that is high enough to outweigh the 
Monday fall if this effect is the result of settlement.  This rationale is unclear and needs 
further explanation. 
 
Lakonishok and Levi (1982) study daily CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted 
index returns from 1962 to 1979.  They assume returns are generated according to the 
calendar time assumption that Monday returns should be three times as large as returns 
on other days of the week.  They discuss how securities are often purchased with 
checks, forcing the seller to wait an additional business day for the check to clear before 
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using the money.  They also discuss how equities settled on a T+4 time frame prior to 
February 9, 1968 and on a T+5 time frame after that date.  They make no adjustment 
for the settlement period in the T+4 regime because trades on each day of the week 
settle on the same day of the next week.  This is true for all cases except holidays, 
which they ignore in the T+4 regime.  In the T+5 period, they adjust Monday and Friday 
returns by subtracting and adding two days of interest at the prime rate, respectively; 
they also account for holidays.  Based on this methodology, they do not find that 
settlement explains the DOTW effect. 
 
DeGennaro (1990) uses CRSP daily value-weighted index data from 1970 to 1982, 
when the settlement cycle was T+5 and check clearing required an additional business 
day.  He accounts for both settlement and check clearing to model stock returns as a 
function of payment delays.  He finds that buyers compensate sellers for the payment 
delay at the risk-free rate over the sample period.  From 1970-1972, he finds that sellers 
require a premium of over four times the risk-free rate for the payment delay and 
suggests that prospective processing errors are costly to fix and delay payment by more 
than six business days.  His study also finds that the day of the week effect still exists 
when the model controls for the payment delay. 
 
Berument and Kiymaz (2001) use the S&P 500 index from January 1973 to October 
1997 to investigate the day of the week effect.  Part of their sample period includes the 
T+3 regime (July 1995-October 1997), but much of their data are from the T+5 
settlement cycle system.  Furthermore, they make no adjustment for settlement.  
Instead, they state that their contribution is documenting the day of the week effect 
using a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) model, which 
allows for changes in volatility over time.  They confirm that the highest daily returns are 
on Wednesdays and the lowest daily returns are on Mondays, which is consistent with 









A trader who sells stock that he does not own engages in short selling.  A short seller 
expects the stock price will drop, so he sells the stock at its current price.  To make 
delivery to the opposing party in the trade, he borrows stock.  If the price drops, he can 
buy the stock back at a lower price and replace the borrowed shares.  His profit is the 
difference between the high sale price and the low purchase price minus transactions 
costs, such as commissions and interest on the stock loan, and minus dividends, if any, 
that must be paid to the lender of the borrowed stock.  If the price rises, in contrast to 
the short seller‟s expectation, he can either wait indefinitely for a favorable decline in 
stock price or buy the stock and realize the loss.  There is potential for unlimited loss 
with short selling since the stock price can, in theory, increase ad infinitum. 
 
A short seller borrows shares with the help of his BD.  The borrowed shares can come 
from the BD‟s own trading account, from another one of the BD‟s clients, or from 
another BD.  Clients purchase securities in cash accounts or margin accounts.  
Securities are fully paid for in cash accounts.  In margin accounts, clients take out a 
loan from their BD for part of the purchase price.  BDs use securities bought by their 
clients on margin to raise cash for the money lent to those clients through 
rehypothecation.  For shares to be lent from a client‟s account, they must be held in a 
street name margin account. 
 
Interestingly, a client rarely knows that his shares have been lent because the BD is not 
obligated to tell him.  Any interest earned from lending the stock is paid to the BD rather 
than to the client, presumably because the shares are in fungible bulk.  In other words, 
no particular certificate number has been tracked and matched with a particular client.  
However, BDs track which clients have loaned stock when tax implications are 
considered.  The client‟s brokerage statement reflects payments received in lieu of 
dividends, which are not eligible for the federal government‟s lower dividend tax rate 
that has been in place since 2003.  While BDs may like their clients to believe that 
tracking whose shares have been lent is too costly and time consuming to do, they 
already track this for tax purposes.  It appears that BDs just do not want to share any 
revenue that lending generates with their clients. 
 
Short selling increases market liquidity and prevents positive speculation from driving up 
prices.  It also allows for the hedging of a long position.  However, short selling is costly 
and constrained, so the proportion of investors who engage in it is less than that 
expected in the absence of these costs.  Therefore, optimistic investors are 
overrepresented in a market with constraints on short selling, and they force stock 
prices to be higher than they would be without short selling restrictions [Miller (1977)].  
Different investors face differing constraints to short selling.  For example, certain 
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institutional investors, like pension or mutual fund managers, may be forbidden from 
engaging in short selling by the terms of their governing prospectuses.  BDs acting as 
market makers generally encounter the fewest constraints of all market participants.  
Individuals, on the other hand, often deal with many constraints to short selling. 
 
Most individual investors bear a number of costs associated with short selling and 
borrowing stock.  The average individual investor does not have access to the proceeds 
of his short sale.  Instead, his BD requires him to keep all of the cash in his account as 
collateral.  Actually, the short seller must supply 102% of the market value of the stock 
as collateral in most cases, according to Christoffersen et al. (2007).  The short seller‟s 
BD earns the market rate of interest on the balance.  A portion of the interest, referred 
to as the rebate rate, may be returned to the short seller.   Part compensates the stock 
lender‟s BD at the rebate spread.  Figure 4 shows the features of short selling.   
 
The vast majority of stocks are easy to borrow, so the short seller usually receives a 
positive rebate rate of around 10-20 basis points less than the current overnight market 
rate that his BD earns on the deposited balance [Christoffersen et al. (2007) and Evans 
et al. (2009)].  For easy to borrow stocks, the rebate rate is referred to as the general 
collateral (GC) rate.  The overnight market rate is measured as the effective Fed funds 
rate.  For special stocks, which are difficult to borrow and comprise about 10% of the 
lending market, the rebate rate is lower than the GC rate and may even be negative, 
meaning that the short seller pays to cover the higher cost to borrow the stock.  
Specialness, or the specialness spread, is the difference between the rebate rate on 








GC = general collateral; bp = basis points 
 
Figure 4.  Features of short selling.27 
                                            
27
 The lender‟s economic and voting rights are discussed in more detail below. 
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An individual investor risks the possibility that, as a short seller, he may have to cover 
his position earlier than he would like either due to the lender recalling the security or 
due to a stock price increase.  In the first case, the short seller‟s BD may need to return 
the borrowed shares to the lender, obligating him to close out the position.  In the 
second case, if the stock price soars, the short seller will receive a margin call from his 
BD to post the maintenance margin.  If the short seller wants to avoid tying up more 
cash indefinitely in the account, he may sell the securities to close out the position at a 
loss.  Conversely, some powerful, wealthy individual investors may be able to avoid the 
cost of posting collateral and may be less susceptible to the risk of covering positions 
earlier than desired.  Francis and Ibbotson (2002) state that BDs allow “substantial” 
individual investors, citing examples such as Rockefeller, DuPont, and Ford, to post less 
margin than regular clients.  The amount may be negotiable, and it may be zero. 
 
Additional restrictions are imposed by regulations that govern short selling.  Examples 
include the previously enforced up-tick rule and Regulation SHO (Reg SHO).  The up-
tick rule banned short selling at a price referred to as a down tick or a zero tick.  A down 
tick results when a short sale occurs at a price lower than the last sale price.  A zero tick 
results when a short sale occurs at a price equal to the last sale price and when the last 
sale price is lower than the last different sale price.  On the other hand, if a short sale 
occurs at a price equal to the last sale price with the last sale price higher than the last 
different sale price, then the result is a zero-plus tick.  If the short sale price is greater 
than the last sale price, this is a plus tick.  Under the up-tick rule, short selling was 
allowed for a zero-plus and a plus tick.  This restriction was in place from the 1930s until 
July 6, 2007.  Reg SHO, discussed in detail below, is meant to prevent delivery failures. 
 
In short, BDs require individuals to maintain margin and prohibit the use of the sale 
proceeds until the position is closed out.  Market makers and institutional investors are 
not subject to these requirements.  Francis and Ibbotson (2002) state that institutional 
investors, giving examples such as Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, can sell short without 
providing any collateral.  Therefore, most short selling is done by stock exchange 
members.  Jones (2007) claims that “NYSE members accounted for about two-thirds of 
short sales on the NYSE, and the public accounted for the remainder.  Specialists, who 
often sell short to meet public buy orders, accounted for about 40 percent of the 
members‟ total.”   
 
The proportion of short selling to total trade volume has been increasing over time.  
Drummond (2006) reports that while NYSE volume has increased 100 times since 
1973, short selling has increased even faster, at five times that rate.  At a September 
2009 Roundtable, SEC Chairman Shapiro acknowledged the “exponential increase in 
short selling” since the 1990s.  In fact, Diether et al. (2009) find that short selling 
accounted for nearly a quarter of the volume on the NYSE and almost a third of the 




Short interest is the number of total shares of stock sold short, while the short interest 
ratio divides short interest by the average trading volume.  The existence of short 
interest may convey negative information, with higher levels implying a more bearish 
signal.  Asquith and Meulbroek (1996) study monthly short interest for firms listed on the 
NYSE and Amex from 1976-1993 and find that stocks with high short interest levels 
have significantly worse performance than comparable firms without short interest. 
 
The 2008 DTCC Annual Report shows that members‟ short positions in securities on 
deposit at DTC increased from $3.8 million at the end of 2007 to $34.7 million at the end 
of 2008.  Alternatively, open positions at NSCC, which double count by including both 
the buy and sell sides of the trade, totaled $1.057 billion on December 31, 2008. 
 
Chen and Singal (2003) find that short sellers impact prices systematically by way of 
speculative short sales that are closed out before the weekend and reopened on 
Mondays.  These actions result in higher prices and returns on Fridays, followed by a 
reversal on Mondays. 
 
Blau et al. (2006) examine short selling of NYSE-listed stocks across different 
exchanges, including the NYSE, NASDAQ, and other exchanges, both electronic and 
regional.  They use Trade and Quote (TAQ) data from CRSP for the 64 trading days in 
the third quarter of 2005.  By total volume and short sale volume, they document that 
around 80% of trades of NYSE-listed securities occur on the NYSE, around 15% on the 
NASDAQ, and the remainder on smaller exchanges, including Archipelago, Boston, 
Chicago, National, and Philadelphia.  On the NYSE, average total trade volume was 
approximately 535,000 trades per day, and short sale volume averaged approximately 
142,000 trades per day.  Overall, the percentage of short sale volume to total trade 
volume was approximately 27% for their sample of 2,139 NYSE-listed securities. 
 
Generally, the proportion of the exchange‟s total trade volume to all exchanges‟ total 
trade volume was equivalent to the proportion of the exchange‟s short sale volume to all 
exchanges‟ short sale volume.  There were two notable exceptions.  The ratio of short 
sale volume on Archipelago versus all exchanges was higher than the ratio of total 
volume on Archipelago versus all exchanges.  The authors presume this is due to the 
secrecy provided by the electronic medium of the exchange.  The opposite was found 
on the Chicago Stock Exchange, where short sale volume on that exchange relative to 
all exchanges made up a substantially lower proportion than total trade volume on that 
exchange relative to all exchanges.  Additionally, they find that the smaller exchanges 
provide an important marketplace for certain securities even if those exchanges do not 
have substantial activity in the entire spectrum of NYSE-listed securities.   
 
On average, total trades are larger than short sale trades on all the exchanges 
excluding NASDAQ.  On the NYSE, the average total (short sale) trade size was 560 
(432) shares.  On the NASDAQ, the average total (short sale) trade size was 700 (736) 
shares.  All exchanges showed the well-documented intraday volume pattern for both 
31 
 
total and short sale trades.  The U-shape reflects more volume near market‟s open and 
close, with less volume in the middle of the day.  Finally, Blau et al. (2006) show that 
short selling is more common for higher priced firms, higher volatility firms, and firms 
with smaller capitalization.   
 
Fails to Deliver (FTDs) 
 
For equities, failure to deliver (FTD) occurs when a seller does not deliver stock upon 
settlement on T+3.  Often, it is the result of a short sale because stock must be 
borrowed for delivery.  However, sales where the seller is long in the underlying security 
experience infrequent failed delivery as well, particularly if the stock is held in certificate 
form.  Legitimate reasons for FTDs include human or mechanical errors and processing 
delays.  Naked short selling (NSS) occurs when a short seller does not borrow or 
arrange to borrow shares of stock by settlement, guaranteeing FTD on T+3.  All naked 
short sales result in FTDs, but not all FTDs are the result of naked short selling.  For 
example, a seller (short or long) could make a good faith effort to deliver stock on T+3, 
but for any one of a myriad of potential reasons, he fails to do so.  Consequently, he 
fails to deliver, but he may or may not be naked short selling. 
 
If a short seller fails to deliver, then the trade remains open and morphs into an undated 
and unhedged forward contract.  Institutions settle on a DVP basis, so no cash is 
exchanged if no shares are delivered.  BDs settle through the NSCC‟s CNS system; if 
no shares are delivered in the PDQ cycle, no cash is sent on T+3.  If a buyer is an 
institutional investor, he is aware of the failed delivery and likely considers it a benefit.  If 
a buyer is an individual investor, he is unaware of the failed delivery, and it likely does 
not benefit or harm him.  However, it benefits his BD. 
 
When a stock is sold short, the buyer does not know that he is purchasing from a short 
seller.  In the CNS system, this buyer may not have purchased from this seller, either.  
Delivery is from an anonymous party as determined by netting that occurs on the trade 
date.  Moreover, an individual investor is given no indication that his BD has not 
received shares when he buys stock and the seller fails to deliver.  The only time that a 
buyer would know about a failed delivery is if he asks to take possession of the 
certificate in his own name, rather than maintaining ownership in street name.  
Otherwise, his statement and the corresponding debit reveal that the trade is complete.  
In reality, the BD simply labels the account as still requiring delivery [Brooks and Moffett 
(2008)], and rather than actual shares, the client owns a security entitlement.   
 
The BD can choose to ignore the fail given that his client is oblivious; FTDs that remain 
outstanding are referred to as persistent FTDs.  Or, the BD can demand a forced buy-in.  
Using a proprietary database for 1998 and 1999, Evans et al. (2009) found that large 
market makers often fail to deliver, perhaps because there is little risk that they will be 




The DTCC reports approximately $3 billion in FTDs through the NSCC‟s CNS system at 
the end of 2005.  Since the DTCC counts both sides of the trade, resulting in double-
counting, this is half of the reported $6 billion in FTDs.  This figure ignores trades settled 
via other channels, including DVP settlement of institutional trades and ex-clearing.  
There is no way to determine the number of fails from ex-clearing [Moyer (2006)]. 
 
NSCC runs the Stock Borrow Program (SBP) to make delivery if a short seller is unable 
to deliver for any reason.  Member firms earn interest when they lend stock through this 
program; firms that want to participate tell the NSCC how much stock is available to 
lend daily.  Although BDs earn interest on shares lent through the SBP, only a relatively 
small proportion of all failed deliveries are satisfied via the SBP because BDs only have 
the right to use clients‟ shares in the SBP if held in street name margin accounts.  The 
SBP, which does not replace members‟ obligation to deliver securities, fulfilled 
obligations totaling $171 million on December 31, 2008 according to the 2008 DTCC 




Public campaigns against NSS, claiming that the practice allows malicious investors to 
drive down the stock price of small companies, led the SEC to adopt Reg SHO.  A main 
goal of Reg SHO is to prevent excessive FTDs from abusive NSS.  Abusive NSS occurs 
when the short seller attempts to manipulate the price of a stock.  Further, an abusive 
naked short seller tries to drive down the price of the stock for his own gain by not 
delivering the stock after making no attempt to borrow the stock.   
 
Reg SHO compliance began in 2005.  To prevent delivery failures, it requires BDs to 
document locating shares to borrow for delivery within the settlement time frame.  This 
is referred to as the locate requirement.  However, BDs are exempt from this rule when 
they act as “bona-fide market makers.”  To prevent persistent FTDs, Reg SHO requires 
BDs, including market makers, to close out positions in threshold securities if they have 
had open positions in these securities for thirteen consecutive settlement days.  
Threshold securities have at least 10,000 shares and at least 0.5% of the issuer‟s total 
shares outstanding failed to deliver for a minimum of five consecutive settlement days.  
This is called the close-out requirement.  In short, Reg SHO requires all market 
participants except market makers to locate shares to borrow for settlement.  It forces 
everyone to close out positions in threshold securities that violate its guidelines. 
 
Boni (2006) and Brooks and Moffett (2008) point out that there have not been any legal 
challenges to the use of the market maker exemption nor any references in the 
literature of BDs defending their use of it.  However, within its first year, the SEC fined 
some firms for violations of Reg SHO, specifically for incorrectly reporting fails or 
improperly recording orders as long or short.  The NYSE has also fined firms through its 
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regulatory division for Reg SHO breaches.  Brooks and Moffett (2008) identify these 
firms, including Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Wachovia, First Clearing, 
Daiwa, and Credit Suisse.  In May 2010, FINRA reported fining both Deutsche Bank 
Securities and National Financial Services for Reg SHO violations of the locate 
requirement.  The regulatory body found both BDs had bypassed systems that were 
designed to stop short sales unless the locate requirement was fulfilled.28 
 
Market makers may engage in naked short selling for their own profit rather than to 
merely provide market liquidity.  Brooks and Moffett (2008) state that stocks with listed 
options experience more persistent fails, which suggest that market makers are using 
their exemption to create arbitrage opportunities by engaging in naked short selling.   
 
Failing to deliver stock at settlement does not automatically violate any laws.  NSS is 
not illegal in all cases, either.  If a market maker is unable to borrow shares of a thinly 
traded, illiquid stock, then he has engaged in naked short selling.  This NSS is legal and 
is a legitimate reason for a FTD under existing law since he is providing liquidity to the 
market.  Reg SHO only asserts that abusive naked short selling is illegal as it violates 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.  Since the short seller‟s intent is difficult to 
prove, this law is challenging to enforce. 
 
The SEC believes that the large and persistent fails tracked on the threshold securities 
list may indicate manipulative naked short selling in the market.  In this sense, Reg SHO 
sends a clear signal to the market that the SEC is concerned with short selling and 
wants to provide enhanced disclosure to all market participants.  After Reg SHO was 
implemented, there were numerous companies on the threshold securities list for long 
periods of time.  Moyer (2006) provides the following recognizable examples:  Krispy 
Kreme Doughnuts Inc.  (NYSE: KKD), Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc. (NYSE: 
MSO), Netflix Inc. (NasdaqGS: NFLX), and Overstock.com (NasdaqGM: OSTK). 
 
Reg SHO was not intended to stop short selling; instead, its main goal was to stop 
problems with short selling.  When Reg SHO was formulated in 2004, the most frequent 
complaint filed with the SEC was “manipulation of securities, prices, or markets,” which 
encompasses abusive NSS. 29  In that year, 1,738 manipulation complaints were filed.  
When Reg SHO was adopted in 2005, that number decreased by over 50% and fell in 
the rankings.  However, short selling debuted in the top ten complaints in 2006 and 
stayed there annually through the most recently published list in 2009.  In 2008, short 
selling was the most common complaint, with 1,735 submitted to the SEC.  Short selling 
fell to number two on the list in 2009, below problems with account closings and above 
securities theft.  Based on market participant complaints, it appears that the SEC‟s 
oversight has not assuaged the problems. 
 
                                            
28
 The FINRA news release is available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2010/P121482.  
29
 Source:  US SEC Enforcement and Market Data 2004, from www.sec.gov.  
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Even though the SEC was providing oversight with Reg SHO, there was much 
speculation about the role short sellers played on the demise of firms in the 2008 
financial crisis.  Many people claim that false rumors were spread to accelerate the 
downfall of established firms.  Some attribute the rumors to short sellers who would 
profit from a subsequent fall in the stock price.  Short sellers were blamed early in the 
year when Bear Stearns collapsed and later in the height of the crisis when Lehman 
Brothers fell.  Lehman‟s CEO Richard Fuld claims manipulation by short sellers was one 
factor that led to the demise of his company (Woellert and Onaran (2008)).  Morgan 
Stanley‟s CEO John Mack similarly accused short sellers for disturbances to his firm‟s 
stock price (Giannone (2008)). 
 
Boni (2006) offers an empirical study prior to the implementation of Reg SHO.  She 
uses proprietary NSCC settlement data of the total number of failed shares and their 
age in days on three distinct days:  September 23, 2003, November 17, 2003, and 
January 21, 2004.  She found that the mean (median) fail is outstanding for 13 (2.9) 
days for listed stocks with failed deliveries.  This result is likely driven by market making 
activity in illiquid stocks that have fails of over 20 days to several months, which 
compose roughly 20% of the sample.  Although fails are a small proportion of the total 
number of shares outstanding at only 0.15% of listed stocks, they are pervasive in that 
approximately 42% of listed stocks had some level of failed deliveries that had persisted 
for five settlement days or more.  She uses institutional ownership, book-to-market, and 
market capitalization as proxies for identifying stocks that are special, or expensive to 
borrow, and finds that persistent fails are more likely for stocks that are special.  This is 
because market makers want to avoid paying the rebate spread on special stocks, and 
they are aware of the low probability that they will be forced to buy-in.  Therefore, 
market makers strategically fail to deliver when it benefits them.  Fails are widespread, 
spanning all markets and industries, and include stocks without listed options. 
 
The SEC started collecting and publicizing NSCC CNS fail data around the time that 
Reg SHO was implemented.  The data report the daily number of outstanding fails for a 
combination of penny stocks, ETFs, and NYSE and NASDAQ firms; however, the age 
of the fails is not available.  In December 2009 alone, sellers failed to deliver a total of 
nearly 7.5 billion shares over the 22 different settlement dates.  This is an average 
(median) of 53,614 (766) fails per day per company.  Of the 139,283 observations, with 
one observation per day per company, most (~85%) were for less than 10,000 shares.  
Still, over 3% of the observations were for more than 100,000 shares failed per 
company per day, and 779 observations were for more than a million shares failed per 
company per day. 
 
Brooks and Moffett (2008) examine naked short selling and claim that this practice is 
both pervasive and problematic to financial markets.  As evidence for the frequency of 
naked short selling, they state that all equity trades failed at a rate of at least 4% in 
2004, based on the NSCC processing $130-150 billion of equity trades daily and an 
average of $6 billion of fails at DTC per day.  This measure may serve as a 
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conservative estimate since NSCC netting, the SBP, and ex-clearing may conceal more 
fails.  As an example of how severe naked shorting can be, the researchers assert that 
total fails in one penny stock, Global Links, Inc., were around 25 times the number of 
outstanding shares during 2005.  They point to dematerialization of securities as a likely 
cause of naked short selling, and claim, “Since there are no longer certificates requiring 
transfer, the backroom processes have become more complex and opaque, further 
contributing to the ease of failing without consequence.” 
 
Critics assert that naked short sellers flood the market with excess supply by not 
delivering stock; excess supply results from so-called phantom shares and lowers the 
stock‟s market price.  By phantom shares, they mean that there are more effective 
ownership stakes than there would be if delivery had occurred.  Similarly, they claim 
multiplicity occurs when a single share of stock is lent out multiple times because 
individual certificate numbers are not tracked by BDs or by the centralized system for 
lending and borrowing stock through DTCC.  Furthermore, they maintain that BDs 
should be tracking voting rights, but BDs do not because they are often the group 
participating in short selling and failing to deliver.  Drummond (2006) and Brooks and 
Moffett (2008) discuss cases of corporate voting difficulties resulting from short selling.   
 
The NYSE found evidence of universal overvoting of proxies by several of its members.  
A Securities Transfer Association study investigated hundreds of proxy contests from 
2005.  All 341 instances showed evidence of overvoting.  This occurs because the DTC 
has BDs collect and report how the owners want to vote on company issues.  However, 
the BDs often send out proxy statements and ballots to more clients than are eligible to 
vote.  Most notably, the owner of stock that has been lent out still receives a proxy when 
he should not.  Also, when a short seller fails to deliver stock, the BD marks a buyer‟s 
account with a stock entitlement, and this client also receives a proxy statement and 
ballot.  Generally, no stock has been borrowed in this case, so this too leads to extra 
votes.  In aggregate, these issues do not always result in too many votes since voting 
rates are generally lower than 100%.  Bethel and Gillan (2002) document 86-89% (87% 
average) voting turnout for various routine matters in 1998.  Extraordinary matters had 
lower voting turnouts, ranging from 71-84% (76% average).  However, when a BD firm 
receives too many votes, it usually follows an in-house procedure to prorate the votes to 
reflect the appropriate amount.  The result is problematic.  Illegitimate votes are counted 
and may overshadow legitimate ones, and one share may be voted multiple times. 
 
Some industry experts who have overseen hundreds of stockholder votes, including 
shareholder services consultants, stock transfer agents, and proxy firms, allege that 
outcomes are affected by overvoting on most significant corporate elections and 
proposals.  Overvoting may be the result of illegitimate votes resulting from failed 
deliveries, while failed deliveries often result from short selling.  Many times, close 
contests are determined by fewer votes than the amount of outstanding short interest.  
Drummond (2006) identifies proxy contests at Alaska Air Group (5/17/05), Mony Group 
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(5/18/04), and El Paso Corp. (6/17/03) as three examples where short sales, which may 
translate into extra votes, outnumbered the winning votes. 
 
Using a proprietary database containing details on all U.S. equity loans by one large 
custodian bank from November 1998 to October 1999, Christoffersen et al. (2007) 
found that borrowing substantially increases on the voting record day in comparison to 
surrounding trading days.  This suggests that traders may borrow shares to influence 
the outcome of corporate votes.  Furthermore, these votes sell for nothing on average; 
in other words, owners are passing their right to vote to someone else.  This proclivity 
toward vote trading is explained by information asymmetry, proxied by the bid-ask 
spread.  When investors are unsure how to vote, they find that their best interest is 
served by giving up their right to vote to individuals that know how to vote.  Moreover, 
borrowers drive vote trading.  Votes are traded more often for poor performing firms, 
especially when the outcome is closely contested.  Also, more vote trading is related to 
(lack of) support for shareholder (management) proposals.  Christoffersen et al. (2007) 
conclude that “vote trading may serve the socially beneficial role of incorporating more 
information into corporate votes.” 
 
Alternatively, Hu and Black (2007) argue that vote trading may result in market 
manipulation by parties with conflicting interests to the long-run owners of a corporation.  
Short selling and other trading strategies, which have been facilitated by financial 
innovation and enormous growth in the stock lending market, “decouple” economic 
ownership from voting rights.  The authors provide many examples where hedge funds 
use shorted stock to increase leverage and expand beneficial ownership through, what 
they term, empty votes or hidden morphable ownership.  Empty votes are votes without 
economic ownership, which can be obtained by borrowing stock.  In the U.S., it is illegal 
to borrow stocks simply to buy votes under Federal Reserve Regulation T, however.  
Hidden morphable ownership is unobservable, indirect ownership that provides de facto 






IV. Model Development 
 
Model A.  Immediate Delivery and Settlement 
 
I model the following after DeGennaro (1990).  I start with a straightforward model of 
returns with immediate delivery and settlement.  In a world of uncertainty, the expected 
return on financial assets differs depending on risk.  Investors are risk averse, so they 
will only bear higher levels of risk if they believe they will be compensated with higher 
returns.  BDs acting on the behalf of their clients are assumed to be risk-neutral.  
Investors maximize expected wealth.  There are no opportunities for pure arbitrage.  
There are no transactions costs or taxes.  Investors have homogeneous expectations.  
A risk-free security exists.  Securities are jointly normally distributed.  Shares are 
infinitely divisible.  There is a fixed security supply.  There are no margin requirements.  
 
At the beginning of a one-period model, the expected price of the stock at the end of the 
period is equal to the observed price compounded continuously at the expected total 
rate of return on the stock less the expected dividend yield. 
 
(1)                                  
 
Taking logs gives: 
 




(3)           
      
    
        
 
Assuming rational expectations means: 
 
(4)               
 
or 
(5)           
 
where 
            
      
    
        
 
Note that dividends at t are known at t-1 as they are announced by the board of 




Equation (5) models the expected long-run average total return, which is the sum of the 
price appreciation and the dividend yield, on all stocks as a constant value of   .  Over 
time, the actual return at time t deviates from this long-run average by the error term,   .  
The value of    is expected to be positive and approximately equal to 0.04% over the 
period from June 7, 1995 to December 31, 2009.  This estimate is based on the 
average of the value-weighted index return including distributions from CRSP over the 
sample period.30 
 
Note that    measures the business, as opposed to calendar, day average expected 
intrinsic total return.  I assume investors trade and settle only on non-holidays Monday 
through Friday; they are unable to trade on Saturdays and Sundays.  The return here is 
limited to the available holding period over business, or trading, days.  So,    estimates 
the average expected true return for a trading day.  Currently, this model follows the 
familiar trade day hypothesis, which presumes that each trading day should have the 
same return on average. 
 
French and Roll (1986) show that most new information arrives during trading hours.  
More variance in NYSE and AMEX daily returns from January 1963 to December 1982 
occurs during exchange trading hours as opposed to non-trading hours.  They attribute 
this difference in volatility to a small impact from trading noise (4-12%) produced during 
trading hours and to a large impact from information arrival, specifically private 
information.  While they study volatility rather than returns, their conclusions that most 
new information arrives during trading hours may support the trade day hypothesis.  If 
stock prices reflect new information, then prices should change mostly when new 
information arrives in the market.  French and Roll (1986) show that information arrival 
occurs mostly during business hours.  Therefore, prices, and hence returns, should be 
different on trading versus non-trading days.  On average, the return on trading days 
should be greater in absolute value.  Prices should change less, and returns should be 
closer to zero for non-trading days, which are usually weekends, when less information 
arrives in the market. 
 
According to the alternative calendar time hypothesis, each calendar day should have 
the same return on average, so Mondays should exhibit average returns that are about 
three times the average return on other days of the week.  In the absence of delays and 
holidays, Monday has the longest holding period of three days, and all other business 
days have the same holding period for daily returns of one day.   
 
In order to test whether the data fit the calendar time or the trade day hypothesis, I 
model the expected total rate of return,       , as a function of the calendar day return, 
    , times the number of days in the holding period,   . 
 
(6)                       
                                            
30
 See the results section (VI.) for more details. 
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I restrict the daily return to be constant across calendar days,         . 
 
The number of days in the holding period is known with certainty.  For example, in 
weeks without holidays, there are three days in the holding period for a Monday return 
since    is the price on Monday and      is the price on the preceding Friday.  All other 
trading days in weeks without holidays have one day in the holding period.  Therefore, 
         .   
 
Thus, 
(7)                
 
Assuming rational expectations means: 
 
(8)                         
 
or 
(9)              
 
The    coefficient will estimate the calendar day return.  By estimating equation (9), I will 
check whether there is a constant trade day return as the trade day hypothesis purports.  
If I fail to reject that    is zero, then there is no support for the calendar day hypothesis. 
 
Model B.  Three Business Day Settlement Cycle 
 
If settlement issues matter, true prices, in the absence of payment and delivery delays, 
are unobservable.  A payment delay occurs for all trades under the current settlement 
cycle.  The buyer benefits from a payment delay, during which time he can earn interest 
on the cash needed to settle the trade.  Since the seller has no analogous opportunity, 
the cost of the payment delay should be reflected in equity prices, making observed 
prices higher than true prices in the absence of payment delays.  Here, I attempt to 
measure the effect of payment delays on observed prices.   
 
I consider a model of returns with delayed settlement.  Since 1995, equity securities in 
the U.S. have cleared on a T+3 system, meaning that money and securities actually 
trade hands three business days after the trade date.  On the trade date, the price is 
agreed upon by the parties to the trade.  Both parties are contractually obligated to fulfill 
their end of the agreement by delivering either money or securities on the third business 
day following the trade. 
 
Due to this delay, it is possible that the observed price      is equal to the true or 
intrinsic value of the security (  
   plus an adjustment for the delay in payment that 




The rationale behind this adjustment stems from the fact that after a trade is executed, 
the buyer gets to continue using his money for three additional business days, which is 
normally three to six calendar days.  On the other hand, the seller can no longer use his 
stock.31  He sees no gain if the price rises after the trade since he is locked into the 
contract price.  The value of his claim on the stock does not appreciate, and he earns 
no interest between the trade date and the settlement date.  Sellers realize this payment 
delay exists.  Presumably, knowledgeable investors know what this delay is worth and 
build a premium into prices to compensate the seller.   
 
Compensation may be at the risk-free rate of return, or it may be higher given that 
complications can occur during the settlement cycle.  If it is higher, the resulting risk 
premium may indicate sellers‟ confidence – or lack thereof – in their probability of 
getting paid on time.  One explanation for a risk premium may be that there is a 
possibility that payment will be delayed by more than three business days due to errors, 
and sellers require return in excess of the risk-free rate when these errors are costly to 
detect and fix.  Such legitimate errors with a positive probability of occurrence include 
human or mechanical errors and processing delays.  Another explanation for a risk 
premium is that a buying firm could disappear or suffer severe financial difficulties in the 
intervening period between trade and settlement.  During the 2008 financial crisis, 
financial institutions were closed or sold quickly, often over the weekend.  This example 
illustrates the possibility that longer delays may occur. 
 
If buyers compensate sellers for payment delays, the observed price      is equal to the 
true value of the stock in a world without payment delays (  
   compounded by the return 
for the waiting time over the clearing and settlement period.  This suggests 
compensation from the buyer to the seller for the privilege of holding the cash for three 
business days after the trade date. 
 
(10)       
          
  
   
  
 
Here, Dt is the number of calendar days from the day of the trade, at time t, until the 
cash and security are delivered to the seller and buyer, respectively.  In other words, it 
counts the delay in payment in calendar days, as opposed to business days, between 
the trade and settlement.  The compensation measure, ci,t, is daily compensation 
determined on the trade date for each day in the settlement delay period.  Since ci,t is 
determined at time t when the trade is executed, it is not an expected value.  The term 
in brackets is the aggregate compensation that is implicitly agreed upon at the time of 
the trade.   
                                            
31
 The seller receives any dividends paid during the three business day settlement period, as long as he 
was the holder of record on the date specified by the company for the dividend.  The buyer never 
receives dividends paid during the three business day settlement period. 
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Equation (10) allows a different compensation rate for each calendar day of the waiting 
period.  For example, if a trade occurs during a week without a holiday and on either a 
Monday or Tuesday, Dt is equal to three since the trade will settle in three calendar 
days.  If a trade occurs during a week without a holiday and on a Wednesday, 
Thursday, or Friday, Dt is equal to five since the trade will settle in five calendar days 
(three business days plus two additional days from the intervening weekend.)   
 
For a Monday trade, the term in brackets is the sum of (1) the compensation on the first 
calendar day in the settlement period (Tuesday) as determined on the trade date 
(Monday), plus (2) the compensation on the second calendar day in the settlement 
period (Wednesday) as determined on the trade date (Monday), plus (3) the 
compensation on the third and final calendar day in the settlement period (Thursday) as 
determined on the trade date (Monday).  See all possible settlement schedules in 
Appendix A.1. 
 
This equation is also valid at time t-1. 
 
(11)           
             
    
   
  
 
Next, I substitute (10) and (11) into (1), which is the original one-period model where the 
expected price of the stock at the end of the period is equal to the observed price 
compounded continuously at the expected total rate of return on the stock less the 
expected dividend yield. 
 
 
(12)        
          
  
   
      
             
    
   
                      
 
 
As discussed earlier, the compensation measures for the payment delays are 
determined on the trade date for each day in the settlement period.  Since the 
aggregate compensation is implicitly agreed upon at the time the trade is executed, it is 
not an expected value. 
 
Taking logs gives: 
 
(13)            
        
  
   
         
           
    
   






(14)           
      
 
    
 
             
  
   
          
    
   
  
 
The compensation measure is assumed to be uncorrelated with the intrinsic price of the 
security; if not, then the result may be biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates in 
the model due to errors in variables.  Equation (14) says that the expected total rate of 
return on the stock at time t is equal to the expected price appreciation of the intrinsic 
value of the security in a world without payment delays plus the expected dividend yield 
plus the differential, agreed upon compensation for payment delays between the 
settlement periods.   
 
Redefining the terms in (14) to simplify gives:  
 




         
      
 
    
         
and 
 
         
  
   
          
    
   
  
 
On the right hand side of (15), the first term (      ) is the total expected return on the 
security in the absence of payment delays.  The second term (   ) is the change in the 
compensation factor between settlement periods for trades at time t and at time t-1.  
The expected observed total return on the security in (15) is different from the expected 
true total return – the intrinsic capital gains yield plus the dividend yield – unless the 
compensation factors over both respective settlement periods are equal to one another. 
 
Table 4 shows one approach to compute    , the compensation differential for payment 
delays, by trade date during non-holiday weeks.32  This method uses rates that are 
observable to the investor on the day of the trade and adjusts them for the length of the 
settlement period.  For a Monday trade, the differential compensation is measured as 
three times the risk-free rate on Monday (since there are three calendar days in the 
settlement period on Monday trades) minus five times the risk-free rate on the prior  
                                            
32
 Phillip Daves suggested this method. 
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Table 4.  First approach to differential compensation for payment delays. 
Day of Trade     = Risk-free rate on… 
Monday (Monday x 3) – (Friday x 5) 
Tuesday (Tuesday x 3) – (Monday x 3) 
Wednesday (Wednesday x 5) – (Tuesday x 3) 
Thursday (Thursday x 5) – (Wednesday x 5) 
Friday (Friday x 5) – (Thursday x 5) 
 
Note:  This method to compute differential compensation for payment delays during weeks without 




Friday (since there are five calendar days in the settlement period on Friday trades), 
which is the trade date preceding Monday.   
 
DeGennaro (1990) employs a different method to compute the differential compensation 
for payment delays using the daily rates for each day in a particular settlement period.  
Consider the following example, and see Appendix A.2 for a detailed description by day 
of the week.  The return on a Tuesday in a week with no holidays partly depends on the 
difference between the compensation on Friday and Tuesday.  This is because the 
payment delay on Tuesday (time t) includes settlement over Wednesday, Thursday, and 
Friday.  The payment delay on Monday (time t-1) includes settlement over Tuesday, 
Wednesday, and Thursday.  Therefore, the difference between the two settlement 
cycles is (Wednesday + Thursday + Friday) – (Tuesday + Wednesday + Thursday) = 
Friday – Tuesday.  In sum, the expected observed total return on Tuesday will include 
the expected intrinsic return on Tuesday plus the compensation for payment delay on 
Friday minus the compensation for payment delay on Tuesday. 
 
Table 5 lists the compensation differentials for payment delays by trade date during 
non-holiday weeks as derived in Appendix A.2.  For a Monday trade, the differential 
compensation is measured as the payment delay for the Thursday after the trade minus 
the payment delay for the Saturday and Sunday preceding the trade as well as the 
payment delay on the Monday trade date.  Note that cash is available to the seller on 
the settlement day.  He receives cash on T+3 and can re-invest it on T+3. 
 
Often, expected returns are decomposed into the return for delaying consumption (or 
the return for time) and the return for taking on additional risk (or the return for risk.)  If 
we assume that all equity transactions clear and settle as they are supposed to, without 
any risk that they will not settle, then the compensation measures above should be the 
risk-free return for time for waiting for delivery of cash for securities.  In this case, the 
best measure for a return for time is the risk-free rate.  Theoretically, the reason to 
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Table 5.  Second approach to differential compensation for payment delays. 
Day of Trade     = Risk-free rate on… 
Monday Thursday – (Saturday + Sunday + Monday) 
Tuesday Friday – Tuesday 
Wednesday (Saturday + Sunday + Monday) – Wednesday 
Thursday Tuesday – Thursday 
Friday Wednesday – Friday 
 
Note:  This method to compute differential compensation for payment delays during weeks without 




expect the risk-free rate is that security prices may be considered forward prices rather 
than spot prices since the transaction is actually settled three business days after the 
trade date [Gibbons and Hess (1981)].  The forward price equals the spot prices 
compounded by the risk-free rate of return over the settlement period.  I will use the 
daily effective Federal funds rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return.33 
 
Prior studies have documented how stock returns vary by the day of the week.  The 
average return on Mondays is lower than the average return on other trading days 
[French (1980) and Gibbons and Hess (1981)].  While the day of the week effect has 
been extensively studied in U.S. equity markets, it also exists in other U.S. securities 
markets (bonds, futures, Treasuries) and in international equity markets [see Berument 
and Kiymaz (2001)].  If every trade day has roughly the same risk-free rate over short 
periods of time, then based on the differential compensation for payment delays shown 
in Tables 4 and 5, Monday should have the lowest return and Wednesday should have 
the highest return, on average.  Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday should be in between. 
 
From (15), assuming rational expectations gives:   
 
(16)                             
 
or 
(17)                 
 
where 
            
      
 
    
         
 
                                            
33
 See the results section (VI.) for more details. 
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Equation (17) states that the observed return is equal to the true return without a 
payment delay plus an adjustment for the change in the compensation factor between 
settlement periods plus an error term.  For the observed return on U.S. equity securities, 
I use daily stock market return data, both value-weighted and equal-weighted including 
distributed dividends, from CRSP during 1995 to 2009.34 
 
Scholes and Williams (1977) show that nonsynchronous trading of securities causes 
daily portfolio returns to be autocorrelated, predominantly at the first lag.  Therefore, the 
error term from (17) may follow a pattern such as a first-order moving average process 
as shown here, which will be determined empirically. 
 
(18)              
 
 
Coefficient Expectations for Model B 
 
Equations (17) and (18) constitute Model B, the model with a three business day 
settlement cycle.  Coefficient expectations are shown in Table 6.  DeGennaro (1990) 
provides empirical evidence for the    coefficient during the T+5 era.  Using 1970-1982 
data, he finds that buyers compensate sellers for the payment delay at the risk-free rate, 




Table 6.  Expected signs for the coefficients in Model B. 
   > 0 
estimates daily average expected intrinsic total return for each 
business, or trading, day on all stocks in the market. 
   = 0 
if settlement issues, specifically payment delays, do not matter; if 
sellers do not demand compensation for waiting three business days; 
note that if this is true, then the situation simplifies to equation (5) in a 
world without payment delays. 
   = 1 
if sellers are compensated for waiting three business days at the risk-
free rate of return. 
   > 1 
if sellers demand additional compensation from buyers in excess of the 
risk-free rate of return; if sellers demand a premium due to potential 
delays beyond the three business day settlement period; these delays 
may result from legitimate processing errors that are costly to detect 
and fix or from financial crises. 
                                            
34
 See the results section (VI.) for more details. 
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subperiod (1970-1972), he finds that the premium was over four times the risk-free rate, 
or   = 4.27, which may have been due to sellers demanding a premium for potential 
costly processing errors that delay payment by more than six business days.  I expect to 
find similar results under the T+3 system.  Overall, I expect    to be equal to one.  Some 
subperiods, however, may exhibit higher coefficients. 
 
I assume the two day grace period that buyers may be entitled to, as described in Weiss 
(2006), does not matter because it occurs infrequently under extreme circumstances.  If 
this assumption is incorrect, my results will be affected because the actual payment 
delay will be miscalculated.  The settlement period will be T+5 rather than T+3.  If the 
two day grace period does matter, then the    coefficient will be less significant than if it 
does not matter. 
 
Payment Delays on the Street Side Versus Customer Side 
 
The street side refers to the part of the trade between two opposing BDs, whereas the 
customer side refers to the part of the trade between the BD and his client. 
 
Payment delays matter to the customer.  Every investor experiences a wait of three 
business days before settlement.  The seller wants compensation for waiting for the 
trade to settle since the buyer gets to use his cash for an additional three business 
days.  The marginal seller will recognize this and demand a premium in the price of the 
security at the sale.   
 
Payment delays only matter to the street side in the sense that clearing corporation 
participants must post more collateral in the form of clearing funds than if the length of 
the settlement cycle were shorter.  The financial industry publicly discussed decreasing 
the length of the settlement cycle up until 2002; at that time, the conversation was 
dropped.  This cost, therefore, is preferable to the cost of shortening the cycle.  Post-
trade processing may affect security prices in that, for example, NSCC participants paid 
approximately $0.003 for each side of a trade on average in 2008.  However, a cost to 
clear and settle would exist with or without a payment day. 
 
Beyond payment delays, BDs and their clients may price securities based on the 
possibility that the buyer will fail to pay for the securities either on time or ever.  Sellers 
may be concerned that the buyers will not pay for their securities; however, only major 
problems would cause this to happen for trades that are processed through the central 
clearing corporation.   
 
If an individual buyer fails to pay for his purchase on the customer side of the trade, this 
does not excuse his BD from completing the commitment.  In other words, if the 
individual trader cannot pay, it is his BD‟s problem.  The customer‟s inability to pay 
independently does not affect the opposing BD or the individual seller and would not 
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find its way into the trade price.  Instead, the client‟s credit risk to his BD would manifest 
itself in the form of the buyer‟s BD charging his client penalties or fees, passing on 
realized losses, imposing trading activity limits, or liquidating other assets.   
 
On the other hand, if the buyer‟s BD firm has liquidity and solvency problems, then it 
may fail to pay for its client‟s purchase on the street side of the trade.  This scenario 
suggests the BD‟s firm cannot meet its short term financial obligations, and the clearing 
agency did not foresee the problem.  This situation is unlikely, but the dissolution of 
Lehman Brothers suggests that a major market participant could disappear quickly.  
When Lehman collapsed, there was much fear in the market.  Nonetheless, the 2008 
DTCC Annual Report announced that all of Lehman‟s obligations were expected to be 
satisfied without using DTCC‟s retained earnings or its participants‟ deposits.  The main 
consequence was that some of those obligations took much longer than usual to be 
satisfied.  This situation, where a major BD firm goes out of business abruptly, leaving 
its unsettled trades to be closed in a timely and costly manner, may be reflected in 
security prices.  If the marginal seller could sense the impending disaster, he would 
require a higher rate of compensation than the risk-free rate for the standard payment 
delay because he faces great uncertainty that he will receive payment at settlement.  
Likewise, the marginal buyer may demand compensation for the likelihood that he will 
not receive delivery on time in a panicked market, and he will have difficulty either 
forcing a buy-in for delivery or selling out of the position when he has nothing to deliver. 
 
Model C.  Three Business Day Settlement Cycle and Failed Deliveries 
 
The possibility of failed delivery may also affect security prices if market participants 
expect that sellers will not deliver securities on time.  A failed delivery effectively 
becomes a forward transaction.  This generally benefits institutional buyers and the BDs 
of individual buyers.  Therefore, buyers may compensate sellers over the expected 
extended settlement period.  Conversely, individual buyers pay on the original 
settlement date regardless of when their BDs take delivery of the securities, so these 
buyers do not benefit from a forward contract and may refuse to compensate sellers for 
failed delivery.  In fact, they may want to split some of the benefit that their BD extracts 
from failed deliveries and offer lower prices to buy. 
 
Therefore, I next consider failures to deliver.  To build this model, I assume there are no 
short sales restrictions.  In addition to payment delays, there is some risk that the seller 
will fail to deliver the securities, by accident or on purpose, to the buyer.  Legitimate 
reasons for accidental security delivery failure include human or mechanical errors, 
processing delays, and the inability of market makers to borrow thinly traded, illiquid 
stock in a short sale.  For example, there may be a clerical error when a trade is entered 
into the DOT, ACT, or Omgeo systems, or an error may exist in the processing 
instructions.  Alternatively, short sellers may strategically fail to deliver on purpose.  
Boni (2006), using data before the implementation of Regulation SHO, determines that 
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market makers choose to fail to deliver on short sales when it benefits them.  In other 
words, when the cost to borrow stock to deliver a short sale is high, these traders simply 
do not borrow; the result is a naked short sale.  There is a high likelihood that this 
practice still exists since Regulation SHO exempts market makers from its locate 
requirements; they are not forced to document that they have located shares to be 
borrowed and delivered within the settlement time frame like all other short sellers. 
 
If prices reflect the possibility that no securities will be delivered at settlement, or the risk 
of failure to deliver, then Model B, derived in the last section for the three business day 
settlement cycle shown in Equations (17) and (18), must be amended further.  The 
observed price      is equal to the true value of the stock in a world without payment 
delays or failed deliveries (  
   compounded by two adjustment factors.  The first 
adjustment factor is the compensation discussed in the preceding model for the 
payment delay (    ) from the buyer to the seller.  The new, second adjustment factor is 
the compensation term for the risk of failed delivery from the seller to the buyer.  This 
new factor amends (10) as follows. 
 
(19)       
            
  
   
                
 
The           term is a measure of the likelihood of failed delivery.  The   coefficient on 
this term reflects the rate of return for a unit increase in this measure.  Buyers may 
consider greater levels of fails in the market to be beneficial to them since a fail extends 
the time to settlement.  They gain an undated forward contract.  Sophisticated buyers 
recognize this, know when the probability of failed delivery is high, and may be willing to 
pay a premium accordingly for the benefit.  At time T, when a trade is executed, the 
buyer determines the probability that the transaction will result in a failed delivery on the 
settlement date at time T+3. 
 
Equation (19) is also valid at time t-1. 
 
(20)           
              
    
   
                  
 
Next, I substitute (19) and (20) into (1), which is the original one-period model where the 
expected price of the stock at the end of the period is equal to the observed price 
compounded continuously at the expected total rate of return on the stock less the 





      
            
  
   
               
     
              
    
   
                                      
 




          
          
  
   
               
        
              
    
   




(23)           
      
 
    
              
  
   
          
    
   
                           
 
 
Both of the compensation measures – for payment delays and for the probability of 
failure – are assumed to be uncorrelated with the intrinsic price of the security.  
Equation (23) says that the expected total rate of return on the stock at time t is equal to 
the expected price appreciation of the intrinsic value of the security in a world without 
payment delays or failed deliveries plus the expected dividend yield plus the agreed 
upon differential compensation for payment delays over the period plus an adjustment 
factor for the differential probability of fails over the period.  The adjustment factor for 
fails consists of the return due to a change in the probability of failure multiplied by that 
change. 
 
Redefining the terms in (23) to simplify gives:  
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On the right hand side of equation (24), the new third term               is the rate of 
return due to the change in the likelihood of failed delivery between time t and time t-1. 
 
Note that the observed total return on the security is different than the true total return, 
which is the intrinsic capital gains yield plus the dividend yield, unless     and 
               sum to zero. 
 
As discussed earlier, the expected return includes both return for the time value of 
money and return for taking on additional risk.  If we assume that all equity transactions 
clear and settle as they are supposed to without any risk that they will not settle, then 
the compensation measure above for the risk of failed delivery will be zero due to the 
certainty of the transaction.  However, if there is a positive probability that transactions 
will not settle, then the compensation measure for the risk of failed delivery will affect 
security prices as sellers extract some return from buyers for the benefit of an extended 
settlement timeframe.   
 
Assuming rational expectations:   
 








            
      
 
    
         
 
 





Equations (26) and (27) constitute Model C with a three business day settlement cycle 
and failed deliveries.  Equation (26) states that the observed return is equal to the true 
return without payment delays or failed deliveries plus an adjustment for the change in 
the compensation factor between settlement periods plus an adjustment for the risk of 
failed delivery plus an error term.  The    coefficient on the differential compensation for 
failed delivery term estimates the rate of return due to failed deliveries,  .  As in (18), 
equation (27) shows that the error term may follow a pattern such as a first-order 
moving average process, which will be determined empirically, to model the effect of 
nonsynchronous trading. 
 
Coefficient Expectations for Model C 
 
The    coefficient estimates an interest rate.  Depending on how the market prices fails, 
the coefficient on the change in the probability of failed delivery,   , could take a positive 
or negative value, or it may be zero.  If it is zero, then there is no additional return for an 
increase in the likelihood of FTDs.  If it is positive, then the seller is extracting interest at 
a rate equal to the magnitude of the coefficient for the higher likelihood of FTDs.  If it is 
negative, then the buyer is getting a discount at a rate equal to the magnitude of the 
coefficient for the higher likelihood of FTDs. 
 
First, a situation in which    could be greater than zero would be characterized by the 
fail being resolved to the benefit of the buyer at the detriment of the seller.  As 
discussed earlier, this could happen if market participants interpret that a failed delivery 
turns a regular transaction into an open-ended forward transaction.  Then, buyers 
compensate sellers; the compensation that sellers demand depends on the expected 
length of time that the fail will be outstanding.  It seems reasonable to expect that sellers 
would require the risk-free rate over the anticipated extended settlement period.  
Institutional investors likely benefit from an extension of the payment delay since they 
do not pay for securities until delivery via the DVP settlement process.  However, 
NSCC‟s CNS system does not process DVP institutional trades, so the data used to 
estimate this model does not include this group.   
 
While individual investors do not necessarily benefit from an extension of the payment 
delay since they pay for securities on settlement, regardless of when delivery occurs, 
their BDs may profit from failed delivery.  In normal circumstances, individual investors 
are unaffected by failed deliveries, so they may unknowingly pay the sellers a premium 
if their BD can extract it from them.  In other words, if individual investors are 
uninformed about failed deliveries, then the premium may still exist for these trades 
because the more sophisticated BDs stand to profit.  The individual investor is a price-
taker in this situation.  The BD not only receives a forward contract from the failing 
seller, but he also receives cash from his client.  So the buyer‟s BD could be the winner 
in this situation.  If the buyer is a price taker, he may be willing to pay extra for the 
benefit to his BD and may be forced to do so because of competition.   
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Next, consider circumstances for    to be less than zero.  Again, consider the buyer‟s 
BD.  He receives cash from his client on T+3 and obtains an extension until he has to 
pay for the failed delivery.  However, if the security is failed because it is on special, or 
hard to borrow, then the BD loses out on the opportunity to lend the security and make 
a greater profit from a high specialness spread.  As a lender, the buyer‟s BD would earn 
a fixed commission (10-20 basis points) plus an extra amount depending on 
specialness.  If this is greater than the market rate, then the buyer‟s BD is the loser in 
this situation.  If buyers are price takers, then prices may be lower because buyers‟ BDs 
may want compensation from sellers for an increase in the probability that sellers will 
fail to deliver stocks with a high specialness spread. 
 
Less than 10% of securities are on special on average, but failed securities are probably 
more likely to be on special and thus have the potential for higher profits from lending.  
The buyer‟s BD would consider the tradeoff between (1) an extension of the payment 
delay and the interest earned on his client‟s cash (i.e., a positive outcome) with a 
probability equal to the probability of failure versus (2) the loss of potential lending 
income on special (i.e., a negative outcome) with a probability equal to or less than the 
probability of failure.  When a short seller fails to deliver, he does not earn the rebate 
rate.  If the stock is on special, the rebate rate is low or even negative.  Therefore, the 
short seller may weigh the cost of borrowing shares against the cost of failing to deliver. 
 
Another situation for    to be less than zero could happen in extraordinary 
circumstances, like periods of financial crisis, if individual investors assess fails with 
more scrutiny than usual and build a discount into prices.  These buyers may refuse to 
compensate sellers since they do not benefit from a forward contract.  Besides, they 
may require a lower price to acquire some of the benefit that their BD extracts from 
failed deliveries.  This outcome may signal a lack of confidence in a clearing firm or 
member to fulfill its obligation to deliver securities, not just on time, but perhaps, at any 
time in the future. 
 
Individual buyers may be concerned that failed shares will negatively affect them.  If a 
client‟s BD firm, another major clearing firm, or the clearing corporation becomes 
insolvent during the settlement period, the individual buyer may be unable to turn 
around and sell an undelivered stock until the original delivery is fulfilled.  A buyer may 
demand a discount at the time of purchase to compensate for the fact that his cash has 
been exchanged for a security entitlement, rather than a security, and he may have 
difficulty getting out of the long position in a financial crisis.   
 
Therefore, security prices may be affected by delivery failures even when a clearing 
corporation, like NSCC, acts as CCP during the netting step of the settlement cycle.  In 
1995, Adler Coleman Clearing Corporation unexpectedly went bankrupt.  According to 
the 2008 DTCC Annual Report, NSCC stepped in, guaranteed $1.6 billion in pending 
transactions, and worked with the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to 
look after the clearing corporation‟s members through the liquidation process.  What 
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would happen if DTCC failed some day?  Beyond the risk of DTCC failing, the failure of 
a major clearing firm, or participant BD firm, could also affect the settlement process, as 
evidenced with the failure of Lehman Brothers.  Thus, if buyers expect systemic 
problems in the clearing and settlement process, prices may reflect greater discounts 
for failed deliveries in times of financial crisis. 
 
To summarize, in times of crisis, the individual buyer may realize that the clearing 
corporation or its members may become insolvent, and his failure to receive shares for 
his purchase will persist indefinitely.  This will make it hard for him to get out of the 
position for which he has already paid.  In this case,    could be less than zero because 
the buyer demands a discount in the price of the stock on the trade date. 
 
Expectations for the    coefficient in Model C with a three business day settlement cycle 
and failed deliveries are shown in Table 7.  Expectations for coefficients    and    are 
the same as in the model with a three business day settlement without failed deliveries.  
Note that if    = 0, then the situation simplifies to Model B shown in equation (17) in a 











Table 7.  Expected sign for the    coefficient in Model C. 
   = 0 
if the risk of failed delivery does not matter in pricing equity securities. 
if there is an offsetting balance between (a) the discount individual 
buyers demand for failed delivery in times of financial crisis and (b) the 
premium sellers demand for extending a forward contract. 
   < 0 
if a buyer‟s BD influences the price and demands a discount for lost 
lending opportunities on stocks with high specialness spreads. 
if a buyer demands a discount for failed delivery because he senses 
impending doom to the processing system, a major BD firm, or financial 
markets in general.  As his account is debited on settlement, he worries 
that undelivered securities will negatively affect him. 
   > 0 
if a seller demands a premium because a failed delivery turns a regular 






Risk-Free Rate of Return Proxy 
 
The compensation measures for the payment delay, ci,t, are expected to be the risk-free 
rate of return for waiting for delivery of cash for securities, as discussed above.  
Following DeGennaro (1990), I use the daily effective Federal funds rate, which is easily 
accessible, as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return.  Alternative proxies include the 
prime rate (used by Lakonishok and Levi (1982)), the broker‟s call rate, or the yield on 
T-bills.  However, the Fed funds rate is better than the alternatives because it is more 
responsive to economic conditions.  While some argue that the Fed funds rate is 
manipulated, all these measures of the risk-free rate are subject to the same criticism.  I 
would prefer to use closing Fed funds rates to be in sync with the available equity data 
that uses closing prices.  However, these data are not available.  Therefore, I assume 
that the effective Fed funds rate is equal to the closing rate. 
 
The Federal Reserve describes the daily effective Federal funds rate as “a weighted 
average of rates on brokered trades.”  The weighting is done by volume on trades 
arranged by major brokers, and the rates are “annualized using a 360-day year or bank 
interest.”  Rates are updated weekly on the Fed‟s website, but the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York updates these values every day.35 
 
I convert the annualized Fed funds rates obtained from the Fed‟s website to 
continuously compounded rates to correspond with the model.36  The quoted rate is 
annualized using a 360-day year with the bank discount method.  Hull (2006) converts 
an annual rate quoted with a compounding frequency of   times per year,   , to an 
annual continuously compounded rate,   , using the following equation. 
 





I perform this conversion, and then I divide by 365, or 366 in leap years, to obtain a 
daily continuously compounded rate for each day.  For example, on June 7, 1995, the 
first day in the sample, the effective Fed funds rate is reported as 6.15%, compounded 
daily using a 360-day year.  I convert this to the continuously compounded rate of 
6.1495% (=360*ln(1+0.0615/360) and then divide by 365 days in the year for a daily 
continuously compounded rate of 0.01685%. 
 
                                            
35
 See http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm. 
36
 Data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Selected Interest Rates, Release H.15 Federal funds 
(effective) – daily.  Available at www.federalreserve.gov.  
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Return on the Market 
 
For the observed return on U.S. equity securities, I use daily stock market index return 
data, consisting of both value-weighted and equal-weighted returns including distributed 
dividends, from CRSP during 2004 to 2009.  The CRSP Data Descriptions Guide 
reports that daily returns for the equal- and value-weighted indices are calculated using 
closing price and share data.  Securities must have data available for prices and shares 
outstanding on the current and previous trading day.  American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) are not included in the value-weighted index calculations, but they are included 
in the equal-weighted index.  Index returns are calculated from a portfolio constructed 
on each trading day from all issues listed on the exchanges with value price data.  
Exchanges include the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ.  Approximately 7,500 stocks, on 
average, were included in either daily index over the sample period from June 7, 1995 
to December 31, 2009. 
 
Value-weighted index returns are based on a value-weighted portfolio while equal-
weighted index returns are based on an equal-weighted portfolio. For the value-
weighted index, weighting depends on the total market value of each issue at the end of 
the last period, or trading day.  This beginning total value, or market capitalization, is the 
price times the number of shares outstanding on the prior trading day.  For the equal-
weighted index, each issue receives the same weight in the portfolio. 
 
CRSP reports daily index returns as the change in value of the portfolio over the daily 
holding period.  Specifically, prices used to calculate returns are the last sale price or 
closing bid/ask average of the day.  If a stock trades on multiple exchanges, the closing 
price is the price from the exchange that had the latest trade in the day.  Automated 
trades and after hours trades are not recorded as the close price or as the average of 
the bid-ask spread, but they are recorded in trade volume statistics.  CRSP reports the 
contract price, which is the price determined in the market, not the settlement price.  
The settlement price is used internally at NSCC to net trades and to determine the CCA. 
 
Security prices reflect trading by both institutions and individuals.  As discussed earlier, 
institutions hold more U.S. equities than individuals in value terms, and they may trade 
blocks of 10,000 shares or more since they have such large portfolios.  Block trading on 
the NYSE suggests that institutional trades may be only a small percentage of total 
trades, averaging less than 20% of the dollar volume of all trades over this sample 
period and declining over time.  CRSP reports returns using prices from either individual 
trades or institutional trades depending on which category of trader has the last trade of 
the day.37  All trades reported to the clearing corporation are also reported to the market 
and thus available in the data source for the study. 
 
                                            
37
 WRDS Support said, “CRSP uses close of the day market price to calculate returns (regardless of 
whether this price was set by institutions or individuals).” 
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Measure of Fails 
 
From Model C above, the compensation measure for the risk of failed delivery is a 
premium or discount extracted by the seller or buyer and depends on the perceived 
probability of failed delivery.  As the portion of outstanding fails to total volume 
increases in the market, the probability of failed delivery presumably increases for each 
market participant.  Neither institutional nor individual buyers know who will deliver, or 
fail to deliver, shares when trades are processed.  The identity of the opposing party is 
irrelevant.  Rather, the proportion of fails in the market affects participants‟ expectation 
of the probability of failed delivery.  Thus, I proxy for the likelihood of failed delivery with 
daily total failed shares to total market trade volume, as described below. 
 
The SEC reports daily fails data collected from the NSCC‟s CNS system.  The fails data 
are available daily on equity market settlement days from March 22, 2004 through 
December 31, 2009.  Generally, settlement days are the same as equity market trade 
days, but there are a few exceptions.  Data are missing on August 9, 2004, November 
3, 2004, November 4, 2004, and December 26, 2006.  Data are also not available on 
DTCC holidays that are different than equity market holidays, including all Columbus 
Day holidays on the second Monday in October and most Veterans Day holidays on 
November 11.  If November 11 falls on a Sunday, no data are available on November 
12; the official holiday is observed on the following Monday.  If November 11 falls on a 
Saturday, all data around this date are available.  For example, Veterans Day 2006 fell 
on Saturday, and no settlement holiday was observed around this time.38 
 
The CNS system only processes broker-to-broker trades through the clearing 
corporation; it does not capture ex-clearing trades or institutional trades.  In comparison 
to a bilateral settlement system, like an ex-clearing trade, netting in the CNS system 
drastically reduces the number of interfirm trades, so the CNS system processes fewer 
receives and delivers.  The CNS system also rolls fails onto the next day‟s settlement as 
open positions.  Since NSCC fills the oldest receive positions first, fails are outstanding 
for shorter periods of time than they would be under a bilateral settlement system.   
 
As a result of both the type of trade processed and the means by which trades are 
processed, the CNS fails data provide a conservative proxy for the number of fails that 
occur in the equity market.  Therefore, I expect a conservative measure of the risk of 
failed delivery because the smaller observable number of fails is divided by the total 
trade volume in the market as reported by CRSP.  However, the impact on the 
independent variable of change in probability of failure may be small if the time series 
properties of the CNS system fails are similar to those of fails in ex-clearing or 
institutional trades.  Unfortunately, the data are not available to include ex-clearing 
trades or institutional trades and to investigate the differences. 
 
                                            
38
 I discuss how these missing data were handled in the results section. 
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As a proxy for the risk of failed delivery in equity markets, I use the total number of fails 
per day aggregated over all listed companies in the SEC data scaled by daily trade 
volume aggregated over all companies in the CRSP data.  For each trade day, CRSP 
market index data include returns for all companies actively trading in the equity market, 
while the SEC fails data include a subset of those companies with outstanding fails. 
 
I use two measures of the probability of failed delivery on the settlement day, T+3.  First, 
the total number of failed shares on T divided by the total number of shares traded on T 
serves as the trader‟s best estimate of the probability of failed delivery on settlement at 
T+3.  Second, the total number of failed shares on T+3 divided by the total number of 
shares traded on T+3 assumes that traders are able to estimate the probability of failure 








To estimate Model A and Model B, I use a sample of nearly 15 years of daily data from 
June 7, 1995 to December 31, 2009.  There are 5,322 calendar days in this sample, 
and 3,670 total trading days.  On average, there are 252 trading days every year.  The 
year with the fewest trading days was 2001 because equity markets unexpectedly 
closed from Tuesday, September 11 through Friday, September 14, 2001 in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.  However, the DTCC continued to clear 
and settle trades from the preceding days.  According to the 2001 DTCC Annual Report, 
“clearing and settlement took place each business day.”  In 1995, the sample captures 
over half, or 144 out of 252, of the trading days.   
 
To estimate Model C, I use the available sample of nearly six years of daily fails data 
from March 22, 2004 to December 31, 2009.  In 2004, the sample captures over three-
quarters, or 198 out of 252, of the trading days.  There are 2,111 calendar days in this 
sample, and 1,457 total trading days.  While CRSP captures all 1,457 trade days, the 
SEC Reg SHO data does not include fails data for 15 trade days.  Missing data occur 
on August 9, 2004, November 3, 2004, November 4, 2004, and December 26, 2006.  
Also, no fails exist for certain DTCC holidays that do not coincide with stock market 
holidays because the NSCC does not settle equity trades on these days.  No fails data 
were available for Columbus Day in all six years on the second Monday of the month of 
October.  Also, data were unavailable for Veterans Day in five of the six years.  While 
Veterans Day always falls on November 11, it was observed on Monday, November 12 
in 2007, but it was not observed in 2006 when the eleventh fell on a Saturday.39  Table 
8 shows trading and calendar days in both samples. 
 
The impact of the 15 observations of missing Reg SHO data is that the sample size is 
reduced by 30 observations because the independent variable computed, the change in 
the probability of fail, is void for both the day of the missing value and the following day.  
Stata, the statistical package used to estimate the models, reports that missing data are 
allowed in maximum likelihood estimations of the ARCH family of estimators.  The 
priming value, or the expected unconditional variance based on the current parameter 
estimates, is used as needed for the missing observations.  Stata warns against using 
data with large portions that are missing.  However, a small amount of missing data is 
tolerable asymptotically.  I estimate models with 30 missing observations out of over 
1,400 observations, meaning approximately 2% are missing. 
 
Table 9 shows summary statistics of the daily return of the CRSP market portfolio 
indices over the full sample period, three subsamples of approximately equal length, 
  
                                            
39
 Based on the different holiday schedules for equity trading markets and the main equity processing 
institution (DTCC), over the 15-year sample, I adjust the payment delay factor to reflect the extended 
settlement for trades that should have settled on Columbus or Veterans Day by an extra day, with the 
exception that if November 11 fell on a Saturday, I assumed it was not observed by DTCC. 
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Table 8.  Number of trade days and calendar days used to estimate the models. 
Trade Days by Year Models A and B Model C 
1995 144 - 
1996 254 - 
1997 253 - 
1998 252 - 
1999 252 - 
2000 252 - 
2001 248 - 
2002 252 - 
2003 252 - 
2004 252 198 
2005 252 252 
2006 251 251 
2007 251 251 
2008 253 253 
2009 252 252 
Total Trade Days 3,670 1,457 




and the sample period covering the fails data.40  In this study, I use the value-weighted 
index with dividends (VW) and the equal-weighted index with dividends (EW).  Over the 
entire sample period, the average (median) daily return is 0.04% (0.09%) for VW and 
0.08% (0.17%) for EW.  The geometric mean daily return over the full sample period is 
0.03% for VW and 0.08% for EW.  By index, returns were highest in the early subperiod.  
The lowest mean and median return occur in the middle subperiod for VW and in the 
late subperiod for EW.  Over the full sample, the standard deviation of returns is higher 
for VW at 1.28% than for EW at 1.08%.  From early to middle to late subsamples for 
both indices, both the standard deviation and the range of observed returns increase.  
Note the extreme range of observed daily returns.  The largest daily return for VW was 
11.52% on October 13, 2008 while the smallest daily return for VW was -8.99% on 
October 15, 2008.   
 
Figure 5 shows scatter plots of the daily return by index.  The top chart shows the VW 
return against time while the bottom one shows the daily EW return.  Figure 6 shows the 
average of daily returns for VW and EW for each year in the sample period.41  As 
expected from the overall average daily return, the VW average is lower than the EW  
                                            
40
 Additional summary statistics are available in Appendix A.3. 
41
 Figure A.3.1 includes a comparison of the indices without dividends. 
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Payment Delay Full Sample (6/7/95 to 12/31/09) n = 3,670 
average 0.0373 0.0845 
median 0.0886 0.1697 
maximum 11.52 10.74 
minimum -8.993 -8.031 
standard deviation 1.283 1.081 
Early Subperiod (6/7/95 – 12/31/99) n = 1,155 
average 0.0949 0.1195 
median 0.1396 0.2063 
maximum 4.833 2.798 
minimum -6.595 -5.432 
standard deviation 0.9634 0.6914 
Middle Subperiod (1/3/00 – 12/31/04) n = 1,256 
average 0.0033 0.0922 
median 0.0494 0.1551 
maximum 5.316 4.838 
minimum -6.628 -6.353 
standard deviation 1.281 0.9923 
Late Subperiod (1/3/05 – 12/31/09) n = 1,259 
average 0.0183 0.0446 
median 0.0950 0.1242 
maximum 11.52 10.74 
minimum -8.993 -8.031 
standard deviation 1.519 1.409 
Failed Delivery Sample (3/22/04 – 12/31/09) n = 1,457 
average 0.0238 0.0492 
median 0.0925 0.1331 
maximum 11.52 10.74 
minimum -8.993 -8.031 
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Figure 6.  Average daily returns by year and index. 
 
 
average in most, 12 out of 15, years.  VW had a higher average daily return in 1998, 
2005, and 2007.  Also, EW had a positive daily average for more years than VW.  VW 
was negative in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2008 while EW was negative in 2007 and 2008. 
 
Table 10 shows the summary statistics for the annualized daily effective Fed funds rate.  
Over the 5,322 calendar days in the sample period, the average (median) annualized 
daily effective Fed funds rate was 3.70% (4.66%).  The standard deviation was 2.01%.  
The largest rate, 7.80%, occurred on July 1, 1996.  The smallest rate, 0.05%, occurred 
on December 31, 2009.  Figure 7 graphs this rate for the sample period. 
 
 
Table 10.  Annual effective Fed funds rate (%) over the entire sample period. 
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Figure 7.  Annualized daily effective Fed funds rate (%). 
 
 
Next, I model the time series properties of the VW and EW indices.  I expected the error 
term to follow a first-order moving average process.  Nonsynchronous trading of 
securities caused daily portfolio returns to be autocorrelated, predominantly at the first 
lag, in Scholes and Williams (1977).  Gibbons and Hess (1981) reported 
autocorrelations at the first lag of around 0.2 for the S&P 500 and VW index and 
approximately 0.4 for the EW index, using data from 1962 to 1978.  DeGennaro (1990) 
found that the error term followed a first-order moving average process, and the lagged 
error term had a coefficient of 0.259 over 1970 to 1982.  I confirmed that the first-order 
moving average process fits the VW index quite well over the time period used in 
DeGennaro (1990), from 1970-1982.  Over the sample period for this study, I expected 
to find a coefficient smaller in magnitude, due to less thin trading, but close to these 
observations. 
 
However, neither the VW or the EW index can be adequately described by a first-order 
moving average over this study‟s sample period.  I examined correlograms of the 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function for each index over the sample 
period.  They do not support a typical pattern shown by moving averages, as illustrated 
in Enders (2004).  Ljung-Box Q statistics show that the residuals remain significantly 
different from zero when the indices are fit with a MA(1) model.   
 
Furthermore, attempts to fit the data with moving average or autoregressive models of 




































































































































types of models do not capture the true data-generating process.  In prior periods, the 
VW and EW indices followed a MA(1) model due to either thin trading in some securities 
in the index, the speed that market participants processed information, or day of the 
week effects.  It is likely that there has been a decline in these characteristics over time. 
 
GARCH models allow the volatility of a time series to fluctuate over time, and periods of 
high and low volatility can be clustered in time.  Engle (1982) originally proposed the 
ARCH model, and Bollerslev (1986) developed a more general GARCH model.  Various 
specifications are used in studies in the financial literature, and GARCH(1,1) is popular 
due to its parsimony.  Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992) provide a survey of this 
literature, documenting numerous studies that model conditional variance using 
financial data.  I find that the features of the data are best fit with a GARCH(1,1) model.  
The model fits the data using conditional maximum likelihood.  The conditional mean 
and the conditional variance are shown in equations (29) and (30), respectively.   
 
(29)           
 
(30)    
           
        
  
 
         
   
The ARCH parameter (  ), GARCH parameter (  ), and constant (  ) in the conditional 
variance equation are estimated when the model is fit to the data.  The sum of the 
ARCH and GARCH parameters indicates the rate of decay of the autoregressive feature 
of the squared error.  Also, larger values of the parameters result in larger conditional 
variances.  Larger values of the ARCH parameter indicate greater responsiveness of 
the conditional variance to news. 
 
Engle (1982) recommends a Lagrange multiplier test for detecting ARCH disturbances, 
which requires regressing the squared residuals from OLS on a constant and the first 
several lagged values of the squared residuals.  The number of squared residuals is 
multiplied by the coefficient of determination; this test statistic converges to a Chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of lags used in the 
regression.  I performed this test for varying lag lengths and rejected the null hypothesis 
that there are no ARCH errors in all cases examined.  In other words, the conditional 
variance is not constant. 
 
Next, to construct the probability of failure variable, I match the fails data to the CRSP 
data,  aggregate fails, divide by aggregated volume, and difference the ratio.  Details of 
this process are as follow.  First, I check whether each observation in the fails data is 
also available in the CRSP data.  I matched the fails data, which contains a combination 




Before matching, I exclude certificates, shares of beneficial interest, and units so that 
the resulting sample includes ordinary common shares as characterized by CRSP.  
Boni (2006), who investigates fails in equities, uses this procedure, and it is common in 
other studies using equity returns [see Loughran (1993) and Chordia et al. (2000)].  To 
find the daily total CRSP volume for the value-weighted index, I also exclude ADRs.  I 
aggregate volume over CRSP‟s share codes 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 18.  For the daily 
total CRSP volume for the equal-weighted index, I aggregate volume over share codes 
for ordinary common shares and ADRs.  These include share codes of 10, 11, 12, 14, 
15, 18, 30, and 31. 
 
The fails data includes the following fields: date, cusip, ticker symbol, company 
description or name, number of failed shares, and price per share.  The acronym cusip, 
for Committee of Uniform Securities Identification Procedures, is a unique identifier for 
the majority of U.S. securities used to aid clearing and settlement according to the SEC.  
A cusip is made up of nine letters or numbers.  All nine digits are reported in the Reg 
SHO data, but CRSP only reports an eight-digit cusip.  According to CRSP, 
 
“The first six characters uniquely identify the issuer and have been assigned to 
issuers in approximate alphabetical sequence. The seventh and eighth 
characters identify the issue. The ninth character is used as a check digit and is 
not stored in the CRSP US Stock Databases.” 42 
 
Therefore, I manually matched several companies between the two databases until I 
was convinced that the CRSP cusip was simply the Reg SHO cusip without the final 
digit.  Then, I merged the two databases, matching on cusip and the date.   
 
The daily fails in a particular stock reports the total number of fails outstanding.  The 
data include fails from the prior settlement day minus any of those fails that are resolved 
on the current settlement day plus any new fails on the current settlement day.  
Therefore, the value reflects some combination of new and existing fails, and there is no 
way to determine the length of time that the fails have been outstanding. 
 
The Reg SHO data first reported prices in April of 2007.  Although the price per share 
data were missing for many observations during the sample period, I did not need this 
data to estimate any model.  Starting in July of 2009, the fails data included fails in a 
stock of less than 10,000 shares.  Prior to this date, fails of less than this were not 
reported in the data, so the calculated probability of failure may be smaller than the true 
probability of failure.   
 
The process of matching allowed me to remove penny stocks from the data as well as 
any other fails observations that did not appear in CRSP.  Then, I aggregated fails over 
                                            
42
 http://www.crsp.com/documentation/kb/data/stock/stk-0006.html.  
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all companies that were present in the CRSP database on that day; the result measures 
daily total fails.  I did this both with and without ADRs.   
 
I scale the daily total fails without ADRs by the daily total CRSP volume without ADRs.  I 
use the resulting ratio, or the probability of fails on a particular day excluding ADRs, to 
estimate coefficients in the model with the value-weighted index, which excludes ADRs.  
I scale the daily total fails with ADRs by the daily total CRSP volume with ADRs.  The 
resulting ratio, or the probability of fails on a particular day including ADRs, is used to 
estimate coefficients using the equal-weighted index, which includes ADRs.   
 
Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics for the SEC Reg SHO data, the CRSP total 
volume data, and the computed probability of failure variable.  The average fails for the 
VW index are 119 million shares per day while total daily volume is about 5 billion 
shares per day.  Total fails range from 14.8 to 419 million shares per day for the VW 
index; total volume ranges from 1.29 to 14.1 billion shares per day.  While the daily 
probability of failure ranges from 0.19% to 10.7%, on average, it is 2.62% over the 
sample period.  The probability of failure varies with time; it is highest in 2004 and 
lowest in 2009, although the decline is not monotonic.   
 
The drastic drop in the probability of failure observed in 2009 to about half a percent is 
due to an additional regulation written by the SEC as an amendment to Reg SHO 
[Release No. 34-60388; File No. S7-30-08].  Originally, temporary Rule 204T was 
adopted in October 2008, and it was followed by the permanent adoption of Rule 204 on 
July 31, 2009.  The rule requires clearing firms with net failed deliveries to close out the 
position on the next trading day after the fail occurs.  This can be accomplished by 
either borrowing shares for delivery (as equity loans settle on T rather than T+3) or 
buying shares (which would net at midnight on T+1, closing out the open position).  If 
the clearing firm does not deliver, it violates the rule and may not short sell in the 
security for its own account or for anyone else‟s account until the fail is resolved. 
 
Figure 8 shows scatter plots of total fails, total volume, and the probability of failure for 
the value-weighted index.  Scatter plots of these variables for the equal-weighted index 
are similar.   
 
Table A.3.3. in the appendix shows sample statistics for the differential compensation 
measures used in Models B and C.  These include the differential compensation for 
payment delay variable,    , based on both observable and actual rates and the 
differential compensation for the probability of failed delivery variable,           , using 





Table 11.  Descriptive statistics for fails, volume, and probability of failure. 
The count is the number of daily observations of each variable.  All other statistics are daily values.  Fails 
and volume data are reported in number of shares.  Moments of the distributions are computed such that 
a normal distribution would have a skewness of zero and a kurtosis of three. 
 
Panel A.  Entire sample from 3/22/04 – 12/31/09. 
  Total Fails Total Volume Probability of Failure 
  VW EW VW EW VW EW 
count 1,442 1,442 1457 1457 1,442 1,442 
average 119 M 127 M 5.06 B 5.32 B 2.62% 2.67% 
median 101 M 109 M 4.52 B 4.74 B 2.69% 2.65% 
maximum 419 M 437 M 14.1 B 14.9 B 10.7% 10.8% 
minimum 14.8 M 18.7 M 1.29 B 1.36 B 0.19% 0.21% 
standard deviation 71.4 M 74.3 M 1.84 B 1.95 B 1.49% 1.50% 
skewness 1.18 1.13 1.05 1.02 0.40 0.38 
kurtosis 4.82 4.65 3.99 3.88 3.54 3.51 
 Panel B.  Averages by year. 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
VW             
total fails 144 M 98 M 87 M 147 M 206 M 36 M 
total volume 3.36 B 3.60 B 4.16 B 4.96 B 6.65 B 7.27 B 
fails/volume 4.42% 2.76% 2.13% 3.04% 3.27% 0.52% 
EW   
    
  
total fails 154 M 105 M 94 M 157 M 217 M 39 M 
total volume 3.48 B 3.74 B 4.35 B 5.23 B 7.04 B 7.65 B 
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Estimation of Model A 
 
Model A assumes immediate delivery and settlement.  I estimate equation (9), 
            , to test the calendar time versus trading day hypothesis.  The results 
of the estimation are shown in Table 12.  In the first column for each index, the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression estimates robust standard errors.  For the entire 
sample, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the    coefficient is zero for the value-
weighted index.  There is weak evidence (significance at the 10% level) to support the 
rejection that    is zero for the equally-weighted indices. I split the sample into thirds to 
create approximate five-year subsamples.  There is strong support that the    
coefficient is not zero for both indices at the 1% level in the earliest subsample.  In the 
other subsamples, the    coefficient appears to be indifferent from zero; the only 
exception is for the equally-weighted index in the late sample.   
 
In the second column for each index, the regression models the error term using 
GARCH(1,1).  Using this model, I reject the null hypothesis that    is zero for the full 
sample in both indices at the 1% level.  The null can also be rejected for all subsamples 
at the 5% level except for the middle sample for the VW index.  Since the calendar day 
hypothesis holds for both indices over the entire sample period using GARCH(1,1), I 
retain the days in the holding period as an explanatory variable in the estimations of 
Model B and C below. 
 
In the GARCH(1,1) model of the conditional variance,   
           
        
 , the    
and    estimates sum to less than one in all cases.  For example, the VW estimation 
over the entire sample shows that these coefficients sum to 0.992 (=0.088+0.904).  For 
the EW estimation over the entire sample, these coefficients sum to 0.980 
(=0.135+0.845).  The coefficients must be less than one in aggregate to satisfy the 
assumptions of the model.  The model assumes a constant unconditional variance with 
a long-run average of             .  If    and    sum to more than one, the result 
would imply a negative unconditional variance, which is nonsensical.  Furthermore, the 
conditional variance would explode.  Therefore, I check that predicted values of the 
conditional variance are generated by a stationary process using the Phillips-Perron unit 
root test.  I reject the null hypothesis that the conditional variance contains a unit root. 
 
I present z-statistics for all estimations of GARCH models in this study.  Stata, the 
statistical package used to estimate the models, reports “semi-robust standard errors” 
that are used to compute the z-statistics.  Estimates are stated to be “robust or quasi-
maximum likelihood estimates of variance” that are derived using the familiar White 
(1980, 1982) estimator.  The software package boasts that its full method is better than 
others that “set some terms to their expectations of zero, which saves them from 





Table 12.  Estimation of Model A. 
Estimation of             where    is the index return for each trading day and    is the number of 
days in the holding period.  All estimations are performed without a constant.  The full sample covers 
6/7/95-12/31/09 with 3,670 observations.  The early subperiod covers 6/7/95-12/31/99 with 1,155 
observations.  The middle subperiod covers 1/3/00-12/31/04 with 1,256 observations.  The late subperiod 
covers 1/3/05-12/31/09 with 1,259 observations.  For OLS, estimates of    are reported, and t statistics 
are shown in parentheses.  For GARCH(1,1), the error term is modeled as   
           
        
 ;  
estimates of   ,   ,   , and    are reported, and z statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 
*** significant at the 10% level  
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Estimation of Model B 
 
Model B assumes a three business day payment delay.  In equation (17),  
              , I replace the constant with the number of days in the holding 
period based on evidence that supports the calendar day hypothesis in the estimation of 
Model A above.  Using a GARCH(1,1) model, I estimate                  , which 
reflects the calendar day hypothesis, to test whether the payment delay that results from 
settlement on T+3 is incorporated into equity returns.  Results are shown in Table 13.  
Therein, the differential compensation for payment delays reflects the process 
described by Table 4, which assumes the payment delay is a function of rates that are 
observable to the investor on the trade date.   
 
In the first column, for the entire sample, the null hypothesis that the    and the    
coefficients are zero (individually or jointly) is rejected at the 1% level for both the value-
weighted and equal-weighted indices.  Again, I split the sample into three subsamples 
to create approximate five-year subsamples.  Except for the value-weighted index in the 
middle subsample, there is strong support that the    coefficient is not zero for both 
indices at the 1% level in all subsamples.  However, the    coefficient is larger than the 
actual arithmetic or geometric average actual return, shown in Appendix A.3, in almost 
every sample;  this holds for a variety of specifications of the model performed as 
robustness checks and discussed below.  Also, the    coefficient appears to be different 
than zero at the 5% level.  The lack of significance of all of the estimated coefficients in 
the mean equation for the value-weighted index in the middle subsample may reflect the 
unique characteristics of the index return during this period.  The observed daily 
average return was extremely low at 0.33 basis points. 
 
I expected to reject the null hypothesis that    is equal to zero because I expected the 
payment delay from settlement to be incorporated into equity returns.  Furthermore, I 
expected    to be approximately equal to one, which would suggest that the buyer 
compensates the seller at the risk-free rate of return.  Finally, over the full sample, I 
expected    to be less than 1.66 using the value-weighted index, which is the value that 
DeGennaro (1990) obtained over the period from 1970-1982.  A value smaller than 1.66 
would reflect that the current settlement system may be safer than the preceding 
settlement system due to the role of the clearing corporation as central counterparty. 
 
While the null hypothesis that    is equal to zero can be rejected for nearly every case 
examined, the value of the point estimate for    is much larger than expected.  Over the 
entire sample, the results using the value-weighted index suggest that the buyer 
compensates the seller at nearly three times the risk-free rate over the settlement 
period (  = 2.78).  Compensation is even greater using the equal-weighted index.  
These results imply that buyers compensate sellers at nearly five times the risk-free rate 




Table 13.  Estimation of Model B based on observable rates. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                   where    is the daily return on the index for 
each trading day and    is the number of days in the holding period.      is the differential compensation 
for payment delays from Table 4, using rates observable to the investor on the day of the trade.  The 
estimation is performed without a constant.  The error term is modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process such 
that    
           
        
 .  Estimates of   ,   ,   ,   , and    are reported.  z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.   
 













   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 














































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 













































































*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 





The fact that the estimates of    are over one and a half times greater using the equal-
weighted index as opposed to the value-weighted index suggests that CRSP may be 
capturing different types of traders on different days.  The equal-weighted index weights 
small-capitalization stocks more heavily than the value-weighted index.  If institutions  
are more likely to trade in small, more thinly traded stocks, then the equal-weighted 
index is more likely to pick up institutional trades as the closing trade of the day.  In 
other words, CRSP may be identifying the marginal trader in the equal-weighted index 
is an institution.  Perhaps the larger compensation for payment delay observed with the 
equal-weighted index reflects different prices for institutions versus individuals. 
 
The indices probably pick up a mix in terms of types of traders.  Some days, the close 
price will reflect individual traders in a particular stock, and other days, the closing price 
will reflect institutional traders in a particular stock.  Both types of traders likely have 
different pricing for delays.  The value-weighted index may have more variation in terms 
of type of trader since it weights large-capitalization stocks more heavily.  This may bias 
the estimates of the    coefficient to insignificance because of larger standard errors.  
The equal-weighted index may reflect institutions more frequently, for the reason given 
relating to thin trading, so it may give a more precise estimate.  This is reflected in the 
lower standard errors on the    coefficients for the equal-weighted index.  Furthermore, 
this may suggest that the compensation for payment delay for individuals is in fact close 
to the risk-free rate, although this cannot be determined explicitly.  If the equal-weighted 
estimates are a true measure for institutions, and the value-weighted estimates are a 
weighted average of individuals and institutions, then the individual compensation rate 
must be lower than the point estimates shown using the value-weighted index. 
 
I expect the results to be similar using the differential compensation for payment delays 
outlined in Table 5 using the daily rates for each day in a particular settlement period, 
and they are.  The results of this estimation are shown in Table 14.  Once more, the null 
hypothesis that the    and the    coefficients are zero (individually or jointly) is rejected 
at the 1% level for both the value-weighted and equal-weighted indices over the full 
sample.  Except for the value-weighted index in the middle subsample, there is strong 
support that both the    coefficient and the    coefficient are different than zero. 
 
In comparison to Table 13, the point estimates for    are slightly larger in Table 14.  
Over the entire sample, the results using the value-weighted index suggest that the 
buyer compensates the seller at three times the risk-free rate over the settlement period 
(  = 3.00).  Using the equal-weighted index, these results imply that buyers compensate 





Table 14.  Estimation of Model B based on actual rates. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                   where    is the daily return on the index for 
each trading day and    is the number of days in the holding period.      is the differential compensation 
for payment delays from Table 5, using rates over the actual settlement period.  The estimation is 
performed without a constant.  The error term is modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process such that    
     
      
        
 .  Estimates of   ,   ,   ,   , and    are reported.  z-statistics are shown in parentheses.   
 













   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 














































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 













































































*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 




See Appendix A.4 for robustness checks of Model B.  First, I estimate the original 
equation (17),               , with the constant rather than the number of days in 
the holding period, which follows the trade day hypothesis.  Results for the observed 
rates and actual rates are similar.   
 
Results using observable rates are shown in Table A.4.1.  In the first column, for the 
entire sample, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the    coefficient is zero for the 
value-weighted index.  However, the    constant is different from zero.  This outcome is 
similar to that observed across the three subsamples.  Alternatively, the null hypothesis 
that the    and the    coefficients are zero is rejected for the equal-weighted index for 
the full sample as well as for the early and later subsamples.  In comparison to Table 
13, the point estimates for    are smaller in Table A.4.1.  While insignificant, the 
estimates are close to one, suggesting the payment delay may be compensated at the 
risk-free rate, using the value-weighted index.  Using the equal-weighted index, the 
estimate is significant and close to two, suggesting the settlement period dictates twice 
the risk-free rate. 
 
Results using actual rates are shown in Table A.4.2.  In comparison to Table 14, the 
point estimates for    using actual rates and the trade day hypothesis are much smaller.  
The results using the value-weighted index are insignificant at conventional levels for all 
periods examined.  Nevertheless, the point estimate of the coefficient for the payment 
delay over the entire sample period suggests that buyers compensate sellers at 
approximately the risk-free rate over the settlement period (  = 1.32 compared with   = 
3.00 under the calendar day hypothesis).  Using the equal-weighted index, the 
coefficient on the payment delay factor is significant in all but the middle subsample.  
Over the entire sample period, the results imply that buyers compensate sellers at twice 
the risk-free rate over the settlement period (  = 2.18 compared with   = 4.75 under the 
calendar day hypothesis). 
 
Second, in Table A.4.3, I estimate the model,                        , based 
on actual rates over the settlement period corresponding to Table 5.  This model allows 
the return to vary by calendar day versus trade day during the holding period.  
Therefore,    captures the average return for a trade day while    signifies the average 
return for each non-trade day (weekend day or holiday) in the holding period.  Over the 
entire sample period (and for each subperiod), approximately 78% of all observations 
have a holding period of one day.  About 18% of observations have a holding period of 
three days as a result of a normal weekend.  The remaining 4% are the result of 
holidays, and the holding period is generally either two or four days. 
 
Using the value-weighted index, although the constant is significant individually (though 
too big to be realistic when compared to the geometric return over the sample period), 
nothing is significant jointly for the full, early, or middle sample.  In the late sample, there 
is joint significance; both the    and    coefficients are significant and quite large.  In 
comparison to Table 14, where the payment delay factor is about four times the risk-free 
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rate (  =3.95), here the payment delay factor implies compensation from buyers to 
sellers at over five times the risk-free rate over the settlement period (  =5.31). 
 
Using the equal-weighted index, the constant is significant and equal to 0.15% average 
daily return over the full sample period.  While this is close to the median daily return 
over that sample period, it is bigger than the average daily return.  The non-trade days 
in the holding period are also significant at the 5% level, and the coefficient is negative 
(  = -0.04%).  The payment delay factor is less than one (  = 0.65) but insignificant.  
For the three subsamples, the results differ based on the time period over which they 
are estimated.  In the early subsample, the payment delay factor is insignificant and 
negative.  Jointly, nothing is significant in the middle sample.  In the late sample, only 
the payment delay factor is significant in the model of the mean.  The payment delay 
factor here (  =4.86) is similar to that found in Table 14 (  = 4.69). 
 
Overall, the model allowing trade days and non-trade days in the holding period to have 
different returns does not provide jointly significant coefficients in many of the studied 
periods, especially for the value-weighted index.  In the late subperiod for both indices, 
it yields similar results to those found with the model estimated in Table 14. 
 
Third, in Table A.4.4, I estimate                   
    , a GARCH-in-mean (GIM) 
model based on actual rates and the calendar day hypothesis.  This type of model was 
proposed by Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987).  The conditional variance term is included 
in the mean equation, representing a tradeoff between risk and return. 
 
For the full sample, the conditional variance term in the mean equation is significant in 
the model at conventional levels.  Using the value-weighted index, the new coefficient 
has a value of approximately three (  =3.27), and the coefficient on the payment delay 
factor drops slightly (from   =3.00 to   =2.43).  Using the equal-weighted index, the 
new coefficient is even larger (  =6.60); again, the coefficient on the payment delay 
factor drops (from   =4.75 to   =3.98).  These results imply that equity returns are 
higher when conditional variance is higher.  Although the payment delay factor declines 
when the GIM model is estimated, it is still larger than one, implying that compensation 
over the settlement period is greater than the risk-free rate of return. 
 
For the three subsamples, the GIM results are less consistent.  In the estimation of the 
mean equation using the value-weighted index, only the conditional variance term is 
significant in the early sample.  Nothing is significant in the middle sample (individually 
or jointly), and all but the conditional variance term is significant in the late sample.  The 
coefficients on   ,   ,   ,   , and    are nearly identical for the late sample in the GIM 
model and the comparable model without the conditional variance term in the mean 
equation shown in Table 14 (e.g.,   =3.83 with GIM compared to   =3.95 in Table 14).  
For the equal-weighted index, all coefficients in the mean equation are significant in the 
early sample; only the conditional variance is significant in the middle sample, and all 
but the conditional variance is significant in the late sample.   
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Finally, in Table A.4.5, I estimate this equation to test the equality of the coefficients: 
                                                              .  The 
implications of the results of this estimation for observed rates and actual rates are the 
same.  Therefore, the table reports the differential compensation for payment delays 
from Table 5, using actual rates over the settlement period.  Early is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the date is from 6/7/95 to 12/31/99.  Mid is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the date is from 1/3/00 to 12/31/04.  Late is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the date is from 1/3/05-12/31/09.  The estimation is performed without a constant, 
consistent with the calendar day hypothesis.  The error term is modeled as  
  
                              
        
 , a GARCH(1,1) process with 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity. 
 
This maximum likelihood estimation allows the model to fit the early, mid, and late 
subsamples with different slopes for each coefficient, and it allows me to test the 
equality of the coefficients across time.  The results of the table should be compared to 
Table 14.  For the value-weighted index, the results of the mean equation are similar to 
those found in Table 14, though the coefficient on the payment delay factor for each 
time period is slightly smaller.  For example, in the early subperiod, the coefficient on 
    drops from 3.72 to 3.36.  In the conditional variance equation, the constant captures 
the early period, and the other indicators reflect the difference in the mid and late 
periods.  While insignificant, the mid period for VW appears to have the greatest 
conditional variance, followed by the late period and the early period. 
 
Again, for the equal-weighted index, the results of the mean equation are similar to 
those found in Table 14.  The conditional variance terms are all significant.  The results 
imply that the middle period for EW again has the greatest conditional variance, but the 
late period conditional variance is close to it.  The early subperiod has much lower 
conditional variance. 
 
After estimating each model, I performed Wald tests for the equality of the coefficients 
on the payment delay factor across time.  I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are equal in any case.  I find no difference between these subperiods in the 






Estimation of Model C 
 
Model C extends Model B, the three business day payment delay model, to include 
failed deliveries.  Delivery failure is added to the estimation with the number of days in 
the holding period – given that the calendar day hypothesis holds for both indices over 
the entire sample period – and the payment delay factor – as buyers appear to 
compensate sellers for the delay over the settlement period (at a rate higher than the 
risk-free rate).  I replace the constant in equation (26) with the number of days in the 
holding period.  I estimate                                using the subsample 
with available fails data from March 22, 2004 through December 31, 2009 to test 
whether changes in the probability that the seller will fail to deliver are reflected in equity 
returns.  The new term can be thought of as a measure of the compensation for the risk 
of failed delivery.  If the risk is negligible, then compensation will be zero due to the 
certainty of the transaction.  However, when equity transactions do not clear and settle 
as they should, the risk of failed delivery may be priced in equity trades. 
 
Results are shown in Table 15.43  The first column reports Model A, which assume 
immediate payment and delivery under the calendar day hypothesis, over the sample 
period from 3/22/04 to 12/31/09.  The next three columns reporting Models B and C use 
observable Fed funds rates to estimate the differential compensation for payment 
delays, as described in Table 4.  The last three columns use actual rates over the 
settlement period, as described in Table 5, to estimate the differential compensation for 
payment delays.  The results are similar when either actual or observed rates are used 
in the estimation.  To observe the similarity, compare column (2) with column (5), or 
columns (3) and (6), or columns (4) and (7). 
 
The null hypotheses that each coefficient is equal to zero can be rejected for nearly 
every coefficient.  The only exception is for    in columns (4) and (7), which is discussed 
in more detail below.  When the probability of failed delivery is controlled for in the 
model, buyers compensate sellers at over four times the risk-free rate over the 
settlement period (  = 4.28-4.73 using the value-weighted index and   = 5.34-5.58 
using the equal-weighted index).  These estimates of    are slightly higher than they are 
in Model B estimations. 
 
In columns (3) and (6), I use the differential probability of failure on the day of trade.  In 
other words, the change in probability of failure is the ratio of total failed shares to total 
shares traded on the trade day (T) minus the same ratio on the prior trading day (T-1).  
This measure serves as the trader‟s best estimate of the probability of failed delivery on  
                                            
43
 The 15 missing fails data observations result in the sample size decreasing by 30 – due the variable 
being a change in probability of fails from one day to the next – as these observations are dropped from 
the estimation.  I re-estimate Model C after setting the missing values of the change in the probability of 
failure equal to the change in the probability of failure on the prior settlement day.  The results are 
essentially unchanged from Table 15. 
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Table 15.  Estimation of Model C. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                                where    is the daily return on 
the index for each trading day and    is the number of days in the holding period over the sample period 
from 3/22/04 to 12/31/09.  When     is based on observable (actual) rates, the Table 4 (5) method 
estimates the differential compensation for payment delays.  The            measures the differential 
compensation for the risk of failed delivery using the difference in fails either on T minus T-1 or on T+3 
minus T+2.  All estimations are performed without a constant.  The GARCH(1,1) process models the error 
term as   
           
        
 .  z-statistics are shown in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the  1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
    based on: Observable Rates Actual Rates 
           based on: n/a T – (T-1) T+3 – T+2 n/a T – (T-1) T+3 – T+2 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 




























































































































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 





























































































































































settlement at T+3.  Here, buyers appear to compensate sellers for an increase in the 
probability that the seller will fail to deliver, turning the trade into a forward contract.  The 
results suggest that buyers will pay around 11% daily for a one unit increase in the 
change in probability of failed delivery (  = 0.113 for the VW index and   = 0.108 for the 
EW index). However, this means that the probability of failed delivery would have to 
change from zero to one (100% failed delivery) in one day, which is unrealistic.  In fact, 
the values of the change in the probability of fail variable over the sample period are 
much less variable.  As reported in Table A.3.3, the change in the probability of fail 
ranges from -0.066 to 0.065; the average is -4x10-5, and the standard deviation is 0.007. 
 
To better interpret this coefficient, consider a one percentage point increase in the 
change in probability of failed delivery from its mean.  If the probability of failed delivery 
changes from zero to 0.01, then buyers compensate sellers with around 11 basis points 
daily for this higher probability of failed delivery.  Consider a stock that costs $50 per 
share; this coefficient suggests a price change of four cents for a one standard deviation 
increase in the probability of fails ($50 x 0.00706 x 0.113 = $0.04).44 
 
In columns (4) and (7), I use the differential probability of failure on the settlement day.  
The change in probability of failure is the ratio of total failed shares to total shares 
traded on the settlement day (T+3) minus the same ratio on the preceding settlement 
day (T+2).  This measure serves as the trader‟s estimate of the probability of failed 
delivery assuming perfect foresight.  Here, I fail to reject that    is equal to zero at 
conventional levels of significance.  However, the sign on the coefficient is negative (  = 
-0.035 for the VW index and   = -0.027 for the EW index), suggesting that buyers want 
compensation from sellers for an increase in the probability that the seller will fail to 
deliver.  This could be plausible if the purchase price is determined by the buyer‟s BD 
who wants the option to lend the security and believes that a higher probability of failure 
means that the stock is more likely to be on special.  In this case, the buyer‟s BD is 
losing out on the ability to lend a stock at a high specialness spread.  The results, 
though insignificant, suggests that buyers require compensation of approximately three 
basis points per day for a one percentage point increase in the change in probability of 
failed delivery from its mean. 
 
So b2 could be less than zero if the buyer‟s BD loses out on the opportunity to lend a 
security on special and make a greater profit from a high specialness spread.  The 
change in the proportion of the specialness spread to the risk-free rate over time could 
affect the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the differential compensation for the 
probability of failed delivery.  For most stocks, the specialness spread is zero, and the 
rebate rate is the Fed funds rate minus the lender‟s fixed commission of 10-20 basis 
points.  For less than 10% of stocks, the specialness spread is positive, and the lender 
makes both a fixed commission and an extra fee for the stock over 20 basis points.  
                                            
44
 The mean absolute change in the stock return is              x    = 0.00403 x 0.113 = 0.00046, or 
approximately 5 basis points. 
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Evans et al. (2009) report that the average spread between the Fed funds and general 
collateral rate is 21 basis points for equities. 
 
Assume lenders earn an average 25 basis point specialness spread over the 
approximate six-year sample period that includes the fails data.  Moreover, the range of 
the Fed funds rate from 3/22/04-12/31/09 is 0.05% to 5.41%.  When the risk-free rate is 
5.41%, the estimate is around 1.05, whereas when the risk-free rate is 0.05%, the 
estimate is around 6.  If the lending rate is less responsive than the risk-free rate and 
rates decline, then the result will be a much larger coefficient. 
 
With perfect foresight, a buyer or his BD could estimate the probability of failed delivery 
on T+3, and an increase in the probability of fails on the settlement date, rather than on 
the trade date, measures the true impact on the buyer.  The             and 
             variables are significantly and negatively correlated, with a correlation 
coefficient of -0.2, as reported in Table A.3.4.  However, the probability of failure two 
and three business days in the future is very difficult for market participants to predict; 
the quality of their forecasts is poor.  Thus, consideration of observable fails on the day 
of the trade is more reasonable. 
 
See Appendix A.5 for robustness checks of Model C.  First, I estimate the original 
equation (26),                            , with a constant rather than the 
number of days in the holding period, which follows the trade day hypothesis.  In 
comparison to Table 15, the point estimates for    in Table A.5.1 are much smaller.  
Using the value-weighted index and controlling for fails, the results of the payment delay 
coefficient suggest that buyers compensate sellers at nearly three times the risk-free 
rate over the settlement period (  = 2.68-2.91 compared with   = 4.28-4.73 under the 
calendar day hypothesis in Table 15).  Using the equal-weighted index, the coefficient 
on the payment delay factor implies that buyers compensate sellers at just under four 
times the risk-free rate over the settlement period (  = 3.55-3.67 compared with   = 
5.34-5.58 under the calendar day hypothesis in Table 15). 
 
Second, I estimate the model,                                     , based 
on actual rates over the settlement period corresponding to Table 5.45  This model 
allows the return to vary by calendar day versus trade day during the holding period.  
Therefore,    captures the average return for a trade day while    signifies the average 
return for each non-trade day (weekend day or holiday) in the holding period.  Over the 
sample period from March 22, 2004 to December 31, 2009, approximately 78% of all 
observations have a holding period of one day.  About 18% of observations have a 
holding period of three days as a result of a normal weekend.  The remaining 4% are 
the result of holidays, and the holding period is generally either two or four days.  This is 
the same pattern of number of days in the holding period that is observed over the 
longer sample period used to estimate Model B above.  
                                            
45
 Results are similar using observed rates for the payment delay factor.   
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Table A.5.2 shows that the constant term,   , is statistically insignificant for the value-
weighted index, but the opposite result is found for the equal-weighted index.  In other 
words, the null hypothesis that the constant is equal to zero cannot be rejected for every 
estimation using VW, but it can be rejected for every estimation using EW.  The non-
trade days in the holding period are slightly significant for the VW estimations (at the 9% 
to 12% level) but insignificant for EW.  This suggests that the calendar day model in 
Table 15 better fits VW while the trade day model in Table A.5.1 better fits EW. 
 
Using VW, the payment delay factor implies compensation from buyers to sellers at 
over five times the risk-free rate over the settlement period (  =5.36 or 5.44) for the 
estimations that include the variable relating to fails.  This is somewhat larger than the 
results in Table 15, where the payment delay factor is about four and a half times the 
risk-free rate (  =4.36 or 4.73), and it is nearly twice the magnitude of the estimates 
shown in Table A.5.1 (  =2.85 or 2.91).  Using EW, the payment delay factor implies 
compensation from buyers to sellers at about five times the risk-free rate over the 
settlement period (  =4.81 or 5.11) for the estimations that include the variable relating 
to fails.  This is slightly smaller than the results in Table 15 (  =5.36 or 5.58), and it is 
30-40% larger than the magnitude of the estimates shown in Table A.5.1 (  =3.67 or 
3.66).  The estimates of the coefficient on the differential compensation for fails variable 
are consistent with both Table 15 and Table A.5.1. 
 
Next, I re-estimate                                      over the period of 
time when Rules 204T and 204 were effective.  Temporary Rule 204T was effective 
from October 17, 2008 through July 31, 2009; it was extended permanently, without 
interruption, by Rule 204.  I use actual rates to compute the differential compensation 
for payment delays.  I use the differential compensation for probability of failure on the 
day of the trade.  A Wald test is performed under maximum likelihood estimation by 
constraining all coefficients except the intercept to zero in the mean equation while 
allowing the equation for conditional variance to be unconstrained.  The results of the 
Wald test show that both estimations in Table A.5.3 are not significant at ordinary levels, 
meaning that the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are equal to 
zero cannot be rejected.   
 
For the value-weighted index, the insignificant point estimate on the payment delay 
factor is negative and much larger in absolute value than previously found.  The 
insignificant point estimate on the fails variable is similar to that found in the previous 
estimation (in Table A.5.2 Column (2)).  For the equal-weighted index, the insignificant 
point estimate on the payment delay factor is again negative and much larger in 
absolute value than previously found, but it is not as large as observed for the value-
weighted index.  The point estimate on the fails variable is individually significant at the 
10% level and approximately twice that found in the previous estimation (Table A.5.2 
Column (5)).  While this might suggest that buyers are willing to pay sellers more for 
fails when it is harder for sellers to fail, interpretation is limited by the joint insignificance 
of the coefficients.  Furthermore, the estimation of the equal-weighted index is unsound 
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in that the    coefficient is negative, and the    and    terms in the conditional variance 
equation sum to more than one (0.122+0.879=1.001). 
 
In sum, results in Table 15 columns (3) and (6) suggest that the cost of payment delays 
is about four times the risk-free rate, and failed deliveries result in forward contracts.  
Buyers pay a premium for the benefit of a lengthened settlement period of around 11 
basis points daily for an increase in the likelihood of failure of one percentage point. 
 
If the processing system has become less risky, then the compensation for payment 
delays should not reflect a risk premium.  The results of the coefficient on the payment 
delay variable suggest that buyers are forced to compensate sellers at rates much 
greater than the expected risk-free rate over the settlement period.  The premium above 
the risk-free rate is surprising and suggests that the new system is not as safe as it was 
before the shorter settlement cycle and netting. 
 
Risk in the equity market should be reduced by the current security processing system.  
Counterparty risk should be very small since the NSCC becomes the central 
counterparty, nets trades, and requires cash collateral for settlement.  The shortened 
settlement cycle from T+3 to T+5 would have decreased settlement exposure by 40% 
simply because transactions settle two out of five business days faster.  Collateral 
posted at the clearing corporation declined by that much as well due to fewer open 
trades for clearing firms at any point in time. 
 
As discussed earlier, the conversation relating to shortening the settlement cycle has 
been revived in the past few years by the executives at DTCC and in international 
equity markets; the reason for this increased interest is to alleviate systemic risk.  In 
2000, the SIA estimated that shortening the settlement cycle for U.S. equities from T+3 
to T+1 would decrease settlement exposure by 67% or $250 billion.  The cost for the 
transition, while substantial at an estimated $8 billion, was projected to yield nearly $3 
billion of savings per year.  These estimates were made not long after the switch from 
T+5 to T+3, so they give a rough idea of the cost savings that should have resulted from 
the initial shortening of the settlement cycle by two business days. 
 
But the results obtained in this study suggest that there is substantial risk in the 
payment delay due to settlement on a T+3 schedule.  In fact, I approximate a huge 
implicit cost of the excess compensation buyers pay sellers using the following 
computation.  I use the coefficient estimate obtained for the payment delay factor in the 
late sample on the value-weighted index of approximately four (using observed rates, 
  = 3.89 in Table 13 and   = 4.28 in Table 15; using actual rates,   = 3.95 in Table 14 
and   = 4.36 in Table 15), and I take the difference from the expected payment delay 
factor of one, representing the risk-free rate of return over the settlement period.  I 
multiply this premium of three by the average daily risk-free rate over the late sample 
period (8.37x10-5) and by the available SEC market value of equity sales reported in 
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Table 3 for 2005 through 2008.  The estimated dollar value of excess compensation 
ranges from $8 billion in 2005 to $20 billion in 2008. 
 
Why are these results contradictory to expectations?  And why do they suggest that the 
stability of the financial system is not as solid as it was in T+5?  The answer is due to 
counterparty risk.  Counterparty risk is minimized for trades processed by the central 
clearing agency, yet a small amount of risk still exists because trades are netted only 
once per day.  Very large volatility during a trade day may introduce counterparty risk 
even with the existence of the NSCC.  Technically, NSCC becomes the CCP at 
midnight between T+1 and T+2, when netting occurs.  Therefore, the trade guarantee is 
not legally binding until over 30 hours after the trade occurs.  However, I am unaware of 
any instance in which NSCC has reneged on its practical obligation to guarantee trades 
for which it has confirmed trade details through the comparison process.  This is not the 
source of counterparty risk that is leading to my results. 
 
A more realistic explanation is that counterparty risk exists and is significant in bilateral 
agreements that clear via channels outside of a clearing corporation.  Unfortunately, no 
data are available to illuminate the size or scope of this practice in which individual BDs 
manage the exchange of information, payment, and securities.  There is reciprocal 
exposure to both sides of the trade.  If the seller fails to deliver, the buyer may have to 
replace the failed securities at a potentially higher price.  If the buyer defaults, the seller 
may have to go back to the market to find a new buyer, and the possibility of selling at a 
lower price and incurring a loss exists.   
 
The premium observed is the cost that results because not all trades are processed by 
the central clearing corporation.  CRSP data captures trades in the entire market, not 
just those processed by the NSCC.  Therefore, the result of three to five times the risk-
free rate is a weighted average of the trades that are netted and guaranteed by the CCP 
and those that are not.  If the payment delay factor for trades netted and guaranteed by 
the CCP is actually the risk-free rate of return over the settlement period, then it must be 
even larger than the observed point estimates for ex-clearing trades. 
 
In conclusion, present-day security transaction processing should provide traders with 
more safety than past methods.  NSCC guarantees settlement of all trades, assumes 
counterparty risk, and requires trading parties to deposit collateral for settlement.  DTC 
has not only immobilized most stock certificates, but its existence has resulted in 
dematerialization of many stock certificates.  The equity settlement cycle was shortened 
to T+3 in 1995.  All of these advancements should have lessened systemic risks.  
However, this study finds that sellers are extracting compensation for potential 
settlement issues at much greater than the risk-free rate.  This result is most likely due 





This study demonstrates many interesting results.  First, equity returns over the sample 
period are best described with a GARCH(1,1) model.  Second, the calendar day 
hypothesis holds in this sample, meaning that the return on equity indices depends on 
the number of days in the holding period.  Third, sellers demand compensation in 
excess of the risk-free rate of return for the payment delay from settlement on T+3.  This 
may reveal a premium for uncertainty about getting paid on time for transactions 
processed outside of the central clearing corporation.  I measure the cost of payment 
delays to be approximately three to five times the risk-free rate, suggesting that buyers 
are forced to compensate sellers at rates greater than the expected risk-free rate during 
normal conditions.  Fourth, failed deliveries result in forward contracts, so as the 
probability of failed delivery increases, buyers pay a premium for this benefit.  I find that 
buyers compensate sellers over the lengthened settlement period due to failed 
deliveries at a rate of approximately 11 basis points daily for an increase in the 






VIII. Future Research 
 
Future research calls for a deeper investigation into compensation for payment delays 
and failed deliveries.  Why are the improvements in the post-trade processing systems 
not translating into lower risk for sellers?  Are regulations regarding fails serving their 
intended purpose? 
 
To better understand failures to deliver, I would like to investigate determinants of the 
probability of failure to deliver particular stocks based on characteristics, such as market 
capitalization, institutional ownership, and market to book values, that may proxy for the 
specialness of a stock.  I could confirm and measure the link between these traits and 
fails using a limited dependent variable model. 
 
Moreover, continuing with my model, I could look at individual stock returns rather than 
index returns.  Using a market model, I could estimate the BD‟s daily loss from missing 
out on the opportunity to lend on special.  I could use characteristics such as lower 
institutional ownership and market capitalization and higher market-to-book ratios as 
proxies for stocks that are on special.  I could estimate the daily benefit from an 
extension of the payment delay for individual securities.  Using these estimates would 
give me an idea of the cost-benefit analysis a BD may perform when purchasing stocks.   
 
I could test whether BDs are more influenced by a potential extension of the payment 
delay when a stock is easy to borrow versus whether BDs are more influenced by the 
lost opportunity to lend a stock on special when it is hard to borrow.  In particular, I 
could test whether the coefficient on my change in probability of fails variable is positive 
when the benefit from the extension of the payment delay is more valuable and negative 
when the benefit from the opportunity to lend on special is more valuable.  For example, 
I could split my sample into two groups based on whether the lost opportunity to lend 
dominates or the payment delay extension dominates.  If the coefficient on the 
probability of fails had opposite signs for the two groups, then assuming the model is 
correct, the theoretical insight is confirmed empirically. 
 
I could also investigate differential compensation for failures for firms that delist.  When 
a firm delists, the fail persists.  The issue generally keeps trading in the pink sheets, 
where delivery requirements are maintained, and NSCC‟s CNS system continues to 
process unlisted stocks.  For example, General Motors (GM) dissolved on June 1, 2009.  
GM fails grew prior to insolvency and peaked on June 5, 2009.  Fails remained high for 
around six more weeks.  As this was prior to Rule 204T, a short seller potentially saved 
a significant amount by choosing to fail because he would not incur a lending fee.  It 
may be difficult to borrow around this type of event due to lots of short selling, meaning 
that the stock may be expensive to borrow.  But that also means that the buy side is 
losing out on the opportunity to lend this stock on special  Therefore, I would expect to 
see discounts in prices attributable to the probability of failure for a sample of delisting 
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Appendix A.1.  Settlement Schedules 
       Approximately 20% of weeks have a business holiday. 
Case A:  T+3 and no holiday 
             # calendar days M Tu W Th F S Su M Tu W Th F 
    3 T 1 2 3   
  
          
    3   T 1 2 3 
  
          
    5     T 1 2 
  
3         
    5       T 1 
  
2 3       
    5         T 
  
1 2 3     
    
Case B:  T+3 and Monday holiday (MLK, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Labor Day & 
occasionally Jan 1, Jul 4, or Dec 25) 
 # calendar days M Tu W Th F S Su M Tu W Th F 
    3   T 1 2 3 
  
          
    6     T 1 2 
  
  3       
    6       T 1 
  
  2 3     
    6         T 
  
  1 2 3   
    Case C:  T+3 and Friday holiday (Good Friday & occasionally Jan 1, Jul 4, or Dec 25) 
# calendar days M Tu W Th F S Su M Tu W Th F 
    3 T 1 2 3   
  
          
    6   T 1 2   
  
3         
    6     T 1   
  
2 3       
    6       T   
  
1 2 3     
    Case D:  T+3 and Thursday holiday (Thanksgiving & occasionally Jan 1, Jul 4, or Dec 25) 
# calendar days M Tu W Th F S Su M Tu W Th F 
    4 T  1 2   3 
  
          
    6   T 1   2 
  
3         
    6     T   1 
  
2 3       
    5         T 
  
1 2 3     
    Case E:  T+3 and Tuesday holiday (occasionally Jan 1, Jul 4, or Dec 25) 
   # calendar days M Tu W Th F S Su M Tu W Th F 
    5     T 1 2 
  
3         
    6       T 1 
  
2   3     
    6         T 
  
1   2 3   
    4           
  
T   1 2 3 
    Case F:  T+3 and Wednesday holiday (occasionally Jan 1, Jul 4, or Dec 25) 
   # calendar days M Tu W Th F S Su M Tu W Th F S Su M 
 5       T 1 
  
2 3       
  
  
 6         T 
  
1 2   3   
  
  
 4           
  
T 1   2 3 
  
  
 6           
  






Appendix A.2.  Differential Compensation for Payment Delays  
 
The following table shows the abbreviations used for the days of the week and the 
number of calendar days, Dt, in the settlement period during weeks without holidays. 
 
Day Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
Abbreviation M T W R F S Su 
Dt 3 3 5 5 5 n/a n/a 
 
The general equation for differential compensation for payment delays on trade date t, 
   , is given by the following. 
 
         
  
   
          
    
   
  
 
1.  Differential compensation for payment delays on a Monday (M) trade date,    . 
 
        M
 M
   
      F
 F
   
      M
 
   
      F
 
   
  
 
For a trade that occurs during a week without a holiday and on a Monday, Dt is equal to 
three since the trade will settle in three calendar days.  For a trade that occurs during a 
week without a holiday and on a Friday, Dt is equal to five since the trade will settle in 
five calendar days (three business days plus two additional days in the intervening 
weekend.)   
 
For the Monday trade, the term in the first pair of brackets is the sum of (1) the 
compensation on Tuesday as determined on Monday, plus (2) the compensation on 
Wednesday as determined on Monday, plus (3) the compensation on Thursday as 
determined on Monday. 
 
For the preceding Friday trade, the term in the second pair of brackets is the sum of (1) 
the compensation on Saturday as determined on Friday, plus (2) the compensation on 
Sunday as determined on Friday, plus (3) the compensation on Monday as determined 
on Friday, plus (4) the compensation on Tuesday as determined on Friday, plus (5) the 
compensation on Wednesday as determined on Friday. 
 
      T,M                                       
 
If the agreed upon compensation for any given day in the settlement period (e.g. 
Tuesday) is the same – or if the difference is negligible – for trades on either Friday and 
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Monday, then I can simplify by dropping the trade day subscripts, M or F.  However, if 
the compensation on Tuesday is different depending on whether the trade is on Friday 
or Monday, then this simplification introduces error into the model. 
 
      T                                         
 
This says that the differential compensation for payment delays on a Monday trade date 
is equal to the difference between the compensation on Thursday minus the combined 
compensation for Saturday, Sunday, and Monday. 
 
2. Differential compensation for payment delays on a Tuesday (T) trade date,    . 
 
        T
 T
   
      M
 M
   
      T
 
   
      M
 
   
  
 
For a trade that occurs during a week without a holiday and on a Monday or a Tuesday, 
Dt is equal to three since the trade will settle in three calendar days.   
 
Following the method employed above: 
 
      W,T             T,M           
 
Again, I can simplify by dropping the trade day subscripts (second subscripts), T or M, if 
the agreed upon compensation for Wednesday is the same – or if the difference is 
negligible – for trades on either Monday or Tuesday and if the agreed upon 
compensation for Thursday is the same – or if the difference is negligible – for trades on 
either Monday or Tuesday. 
 
      W                           
 
This says that the differential compensation for payment delays on a Tuesday trade 
date is equal to the difference between the compensation on Friday minus the 
compensation on Tuesday. 
 
3. Differential compensation for payment delays on a Wednesday (W),    . 
 
        W
  
   
      T
 T
   
      W
 
   
      T
 
   
  
 




Simplify by dropping the trade day subscripts (second subscripts.) 
 
                        W                       
 
This says that the differential compensation for payment delays on a Wednesday trade 
date is equal to the difference between the combined compensation for Saturday, 
Sunday, and Monday minus the compensation on Wednesday. 
 
4. Differential compensation for payment delays on a Thursday (R) trade date,    . 
 
        R
  
   
      W
 W
   
      R
 
   
      W
 
   
  
 
                                                  
 
Simplify by dropping the trade day subscripts (second subscripts.) 
 
                                               
 
This says that the differential compensation for payment delays on a Thursday trade 
date is equal to the difference between the compensation on Tuesday minus the 
compensation on Thursday. 
 
5. Differential compensation for payment delays on a Friday (F) trade date,    . 
 
        F
  
   
      R
  
   
      F
 
   
      R
 
   
  
 
                                                       
 
Simplify by dropping the trade day subscripts (second subscripts.) 
 
                                               
 
This says that the differential compensation for payment delays on a Friday trade date 
is equal to the difference between the compensation on Wednesday minus the 
compensation on Friday. 
 
Differential compensation for payment delays for each trade day of the week during 




Appendix A.3.  Additional Summary Statistics 
 
Table A.3.1.  Daily return of CRSP market portfolio indices over the full sample period. 
 
The Standard and Poor‟s (S&P) 500 Composite Index does not include dividends and is weighted by the 
















average 0.000373 0.000302 0.000845 0.000776 0.000284 
median 0.000886 0.000814 0.001697 0.001628 0.000649 
maximum 0.115182 0.115118 0.107385 0.107294 0.115800 
minimum -0.089931 -0.090012 -0.080311 -0.080389 -0.090350 
variance 0.000165 0.000165 0.000117 0.000117 0.000168 


































Payment Delay Full Sample (6/7/95 to 12/31/09) n = 3,670 
arithmetic 0.0373 0.0845 
geometric 0.0294 0.0786 
Early Subperiod (6/7/95 – 12/31/99) n = 1,155 
arithmetic 0.0949 0.1195 
geometric 0.0903 0.1171 
Middle Subperiod (1/3/00 – 12/31/04) n = 1,256 
arithmetic 0.0033 0.0922 
geometric -0.0049 0.0873 
Late Subperiod (1/3/05 – 12/31/09) n = 1,259 
arithmetic 0.0183 0.0446 










Table A.3.3.  Sample statistics for differential compensation measures. 
The     variable estimates the differential compensation for payment delays and is based on observable 
or actual rates, based on the Table 4 or Table 5 method, respectively.  The            variable measures 
the differential compensation for the probability of failed delivery.  The              variable measures the 
absolute differential compensation for the probability of failed delivery.  The fails statistics are unaffected 
by the use of the difference in fails either on T minus T-1 or on T+3 minus T+2; those computed at T 
minus T-1 are reported here. 
 




Payment Delay Full Sample (6/7/95 to 12/31/09) 




0.00016 -0.00053 0.00069 




 0.00016 -0.00056 0.00054 
Failed Delivery Sample (3/22/04 to 12/31/09) 




0.00013 -0.00044 0.00044 




 0.00013 -0.00044 0.00044 
           
(excluding ADRs) 
1,427 -0.00004 0.00706 -0.06554 0.06472 
             
(excluding ADRs) 
1,427 0.00403 0.00579 6x10
-6
 0.06554 
           
(including ADRs) 
1,427 -0.00004 0.00708 -0.06551 0.06567 
             
(including ADRs) 









Table A.3.4.  Pair wise correlation coefficients. 
Correlations between the dependent and independent variables for pair wise combinations over the fails 
sample from 3/22/04-12/31/09 are shown.     is the VW or EW index return,    is the number of days in 
the holding period,     is the differential compensation for payment delay based on actual rates, 
           is the differential compensation for probability of fail on the trade day (T), and              is 
the differential compensation for probability of fail on the settlement day (T+3).  For the VW (EW) index, 
fails of ADRs are excluded (included).  The significance level of the correlation coefficient is reported on 
the second line. 
 
                                   
Value-Weighted Index 
   1.000     
   
-0.032 
(0.23) 
1.000    





1.000   



















   1.000     
   
-0.050 
(0.06) 
1.000    





1.000   






















Appendix A.4.  Robustness Checks for Model B 
 
Table A.4.1.  Model B estimation using observable rates and trade day hypothesis. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                where    is the daily return on the index for each 
trading day.      is the differential compensation for payment delays from Table 4, using rates observable 
to the investor on the day of the trade.  The estimation is performed with a constant, consistent with the 
trade day hypothesis.  The error term is modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process.  Estimates of   ,   ,   ,   , 
and    are reported.  z-statistics are shown in parentheses.   
 













   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 














































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 













































































*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 





Table A.4.2.  Model B estimation using actual rates and trade day hypothesis. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                where    is the daily return on the index for each 
trading day.      is the differential compensation for payment delays from Table 5, using rates over the 
actual settlement period.  The estimation is performed with a constant, consistent with the trade day 
hypothesis.  The error term is modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process.  Estimates of   ,   ,   ,   , and    are 
reported.  z-statistics are shown in parentheses.   
 













   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 














































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 













































































*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 




Table A.4.3.  Model B estimation using actual rates and a hybrid calendar-trade day 
hypothesis. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                         where    is the daily return on the 
index for each trading day and    is the number of days in the holding period.      is the differential 
compensation for payment delays from Table 5, using rates over the actual settlement period.  The 
estimation is performed with a constant, allowing trade days and non-trade days in the holding period to 
have different returns.  The error term is modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process.  Estimates of   ,   ,   ,   , 
  , and    are reported.  z-statistics are shown in parentheses.   
 













   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 


































































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 

































































































*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 
*** significant at the 10% level  
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Table A.4.4.  GARCH-in-mean estimation of Model B based on actual rates and 
calendar day hypothesis. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                   
    , a GARCH-in-mean model, where    is 
the daily return on the index for each trading day and    is the number of days in the holding period.      
is the differential compensation for payment delays from Table 5, using rates over the actual settlement 
period.  The estimation is performed without a constant, consistent with the calendar day hypothesis.  The 
error term is modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process such that    
           
        
 .  Estimates of   , 
  ,   ,   ,   , and    are reported.  z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 













   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 


























































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 

























































































*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 
*** significant at the 10% level  
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Table A.4.5.  Model B estimation to test equality of coefficients. 
Estimation of                                                                where    
is the daily return on the index for each trading day, and    is the number of days in the holding period.  
Early is an indicator variable equal to one if the date is from 6/7/95 to 12/31/99.  Mid is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the date is from 1/3/00 to 12/31/04.  Late is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the date is from 1/3/05-12/31/09.      is the differential compensation for payment delays from Table 5, 
using actual rates over the settlement period.  The estimation is performed without a constant, consistent 
with the calendar day hypothesis.  The error term is modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process with multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity such that    
                              
        
 .  z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the  1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Value-Weighted Index Equal-Weighted Index 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 



















































































Appendix A.5.  Robustness Checks for Model C 
Table A.5.1.  Model C estimation using the trade day hypothesis, 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                             where    is the daily return on the 
index for each trading day over the sample period from 3/22/04 to 12/31/09.  When     is based on 
observable (actual) rates, the Table 4 (5) method estimates the differential compensation for payment 
delays.  The            is the differential compensation for probability of fail on the trade day (change in T 
minus T-1), while              is on the settlement day (change in T+3 minus T+2).  The GARCH(1,1) 
process models the error term as   
           
        
 .  z-statistics are shown in parentheses.  *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the  1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
    based on: Observable Rates Actual Rates 
           based on: n/a                         n/a                         
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 




























































































































































   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 





























































































































































Table A.5.2.  Model C estimation using actual rates and a hybrid calendar-trade day 
hypothesis. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                                      where    is the daily 
return on the index for each trading day over the sample period from 3/22/04 to 12/31/09.      is based on 
actual rates using the Table 5 method to estimate the differential compensation for payment delays.  The 
           is the differential compensation for probability of fail on the trade day (change in T minus T-1), 
and              is the differential compensation for probability of fail on the settlement day (change in 
T+3 minus T+2).  The GARCH(1,1) process models the error term as   
           
        
 .  z-
statistics are shown in parentheses.  
 
 Value-Weighted Index Equal-Weighted Index 
                                                   
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 



































































































































































*   significant at the  1% level 
**  significant at the  5% level 




Table A.5.3.  Model C estimation over the Rule 204T/204 effective sample period. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of                                      where    is the daily 
return on the index for each trading day over the sample period from 10/17/08 to 12/31/09.      is based 
on actual rates using the Table 5 method to estimate the differential compensation for payment delays.  
The            is the differential compensation for probability of fail on the trade day (change in T minus 
T-1).  The GARCH(1,1) process models the error term as   
           
        
 .  z-statistics are 
shown in parentheses.  The significance level, Prob > chi2, of a Wald test is reported under the number of 
observations, n.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the  1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Value-Weighted Index 
n = 298 
Prob > chi2 = 0.78 
Equal-Weighted Index 
n = 298 
Prob > chi2 = 0.21 
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